S.15 of the Limitation Act only applies to stayed orders; mere lawsuits do not qualify as such.

1. The question that poses itself in this appeal is whether the institution of a suit to vacate an order under O. 38, R. 8 C.P.C. would proprio vigore operate in favour of the decree - holder to enable him to exclude the time contemplated by S.15 of the Limitation Act .

2. The facts leading to this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal are not in dispute and lie in a narrow compass. The respondent filed a suit against the appellant for recovery of a sum of Rs. 14,680/- and also applied for attachment before judgment of certain properties as belonging to the appellant. One of the items of property attached was claimed by his wife as her own and not as part of the property belonging to the appellant. The claim was disallowed in 1953. Ultimately, a decree was entered in favour of the plaintiff - respondent on 21-11-1953. Meanwhile, the appellant's wife raised an action under O. 21, R. 63 C.P.C. to vacate the order made by the trial Court under O. 38, R. 8 C.P.C. The suit was dismissed on 7-3-56. An appeal was taken against this judgment to the District Court, Chittoor in A. S. No. 116 of 1956, which was dismissed on 8-3-1957. The second appeal carried by the unsuccessful party shared the same fate. But, pending this appeal, a conditional order of stay of execution of the decree was made by this Court ort 27-8-1957. The stay was dissolved on 6-10-1958 as the condition was not fulfilled. During the pendency of the second appeal, the decree - holder took out execution on 11-7-1960.

3. The petition was resisted by the judgment - debtor chiefly on the plea that the execution petition was barred by limitation, as no E. P. was presented within three years of the passing of the decree as required by Art. 182 of the Limitation Act .

4. The trial Court over - ruling the objection directed execution to proceed.

5. It is this order of the executing Court that is the subject - matter of this appeal. In support of the appeal, it is urged by Sri Narasinga Rao, learned counsel for the appellant, that the time of the continuance of the suit and the appeal etc., could not be excluded in computing the period of limitation for an application to be filed under Art. 182 of the Limitation Act . This contention is well - founded.

6. S.15 of the Limitation Act runs as follows :
"(1) In computing the period of limitation prescribed or any suit or application for the execution of a decree, the institution of which has been stayed by injunction or order, the time of the continuance of the injunction or order, the day on which it was issued or made, and the day on which it was withdrawn, shall be excluded.
(2) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit of which notice has been given in accordance with the requirements of any enactment for the time being in force, the period of such notice shall be excluded."

7. It is manifest that it is only "the time of the continuance of the injunction or order" and the day on which it was issued or made that should be excluded in calculating the period of limitation prescribed for execution of the decree here. Admittedly, no injunction or order staying the execution of the decree was issued or made either by the trial Court or the lower appellate Court. It was only in the High Court that a conditional order of stay was made but it was in existence only for a period of one year, one month and ten days. Even if this period is excluded, still the requirement of Art. 182 of the Limitation Act remains unfulfilled. Mere filing of a suit to set aside an order made either under O. 21, R. 63, C.P.C. or O. 38, R. 8 C.P.C. would not amount to an injunction