Writ jurisdiction does not extend to enforcing cooperative society bye laws, which lack the force of law and are treated as private contractual obligations.

1 The issue before the Full Bench is whether a writ petition lies against a cooperative society, and if it does, in what circumstances ? The context is the enforcement of bye laws governing service condition of employees.

2 In P. S. Naidu v. Chittoor District Cooperative Central Bank [1977] 2 APLJ 282 , a Division Bench of this court held that an order of punishment made by a society against its employees cannot be questioned by the latter by way of a writ petition. The Bench pointed out "as far as this court is concerned, it has uniformly taken the view that a writ petition does not led against a cooperative society especially when it relates to matters concerning the society and its employees. In C. V. Narasimha Naidu v. Chittoor District Cooperative Bank Ltd. [1971] 2 APLJ (SN) 16, "W.P.No. 3788 of 1970 dated 7th June, 1971)" one of us (Kuppuswami J.) (sic) following the decision of a Division Bench of this (Madras) court in C. Lakshmiah v. Sri Perumbadur Taluk Cooperative Marketing Society Ltd., AIR 1962 Mad. 169, held that an order under Art .226 of the Constitution cannot be issued to quash the proceedings of a cooperative society....." The Bench noted that there appears to be a difference f opinion between the various High Court in the country on that question, and observed" we would, however, prefer to rest our decision on the ground that what the petitioner is seeking to ensure is a purely contractual right, and in substance his case is that there has been a wrongful inference with the conditions of his service by the stoppage of three increments. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Kulchhinder Singh Brar , AIR 1976 SC 2216 , where a petitioner is seeking to enforce a contract, he cannot invoke the jurisdiction under Art .226 bypassing the normal channels of civil litigation. Even in W.P. No. 3711 of 1970 dated June 7, 1971, another ground for dismissing the writ petition was that in terminating the services of its own employees, the cooperative society cannot be said to be acting in the discharge of a public duty. in considering whether a p Art icular body is an institution amenable to jurisdiction under Art .226, it was observed that it is to be ascertained whether the p Art icular act complained of is one which was done in discharge of a public duty. A statutory body entrusted generally with the performance of a public duty may still performed several acts which cannot be considered to be public functions like entering into a contract for the purchase of goods to other property. While doing so, it is not discharging a public function. Similarly, is was held that termination of services is one connected only with the contract of employment. A fortiori in this case, the stoppage of increments cannot be regarded as a public function, but is only one connected with the contract...." A similar view was taken by a learned single judge in Ranga Reddy v. Cooperative Electricity Supply Society Ltd. [1977] ALT 172.

3 In V. Narasinga Rao v. Prudential Cooperative Urban Bank Ltd. [1989] 1 ALT 300 ; [1990] 77 FJR 361, a Division Bench comprising two of us (Jeevan Reddy and Syed Shah Mohammed Quardi JJ.) examined this question. That was a case where an employee of the Prudential Cooperative Urban Bank was dismissed by the bank in pursuance of a disciplinary enquiry, which order was challenged by way of a writ petition. The writ petition was referred to a Division Bench by a learned single judge in view of the Bench decision in P. S. Naidu v. Chittor District Cooperative Central bank [1977] 2 APLJ 282 , and the decision in Ranga Reddy v. Co- operative Electricity Supply Society Ltd. [19977] ALT 172. It would be appropriate to notice the propositions flowing from the decision in Narasinga Rao ; [1990] 77 FJR 361. They are :
(i) The question whether a writ petition lies against a co- operative society or not, has to be examined in the light of the language employed in Art .226, which empowers this court "to issue to any person o

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