Key Points: - The court discusses rejection of plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC at registration stage vs. trial, emphasizing limitation questions are generally triable issues to be determined during trial (not at once) (!) (!) . - It analyzes Article 54 of the Limitation Act, distinguishing between "date fixed for performance" and "date of notice of performance refused," and holds that the relevant date can depend on actual knowledge disclosed in the plaint rather than deemed notice from registration, requiring trial to determine applicability (!) (!) (!) (!) . - It clarifies Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, defining "notice," and explains that constructive/deemed notice is a question of fact to be proven with evidence during trial, not presumed at the registration stage (with emphasis on Explanations I-III) (!) (!) (!) (!) - (!) . - The judgment sets aside the order rejecting the plaint and revives the suit, stating that limitation as a mixed question of law and fact should be resolved on evidence during trial, not at the threshold (!) (!) - (!) . - The decision references several precedents regarding the stage at which limitation and knowledge are to be determined, reinforcing the principle that such issues are triable and cannot be summarily decided at registration (!) (!) - (!) .

How to determine if a plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC when the suit is alleged to be barred by limitation?

What is the correct starting point for limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act in a suit for specific performance when there is knowledge of registration of deeds?

What are the evidentiary requirements to determine the date of knowledge versus deemed notice under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act for limitation purposes?