A Magistrate cannot take cognizance of offences under Section 188 of the IPC without a written complaint by a public servant. Furthermore, a charge of wrongful restraint requires proof of specific individual obstruction rather than mere public inconvenience or traffic disruption.

The Court made the following:

ORDER:

2. Criminal Petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C.,’) by the Petitioners/ Accused Nos.4 and 6, seeking to quash the proceedings against Petitioners/Accused Nos.4 and 6 in C.C.No.555 of 2020 on the file of II Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Machilipatnam, Krishna District.

2. The allegations against the Petitioners arise from a report lodged by one Mr. Lakshmimojinaidu Adapa, a labourer and resident of Ramanaidupet, Machilipatnam. He lodged a complaint with the police alleging that on 07.01.2020 at about 17:20 hours, near the Head Post Office, Main Road, Machilipatnam, the Petitioners, who are sympathizers of the Telugu Desam Party and Janasena Party, formed themselves into an unlawful assembly and observed a Rasta Roko by standing on the main road near the Head Post Office and raising slogans. It was further alleged that, as a result of their actions, inconvenience was caused to the public by obstructing the free flow of traffic. Based on the said report, a case in Crime No.5 of 2020 was registered in the Robinsonpet Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 341 and 188 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity ‘the I.P.C.,’).

3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, Ms. M. Nikitha, contends that none of the offences under Sections 341 and 188 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ are made out. There is no material placed on record to establish that any order was promulgated by a lawfully empowered public servant and that such order was in force at the time of the alleged offence. Therefore, there are no allegations of disobedience resulting in harmful consequences as required under Section 188 of ‘the I.P.C.’ Further, there is no act of wrongful restraint as defined under Section 339 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and in the absence of any voluntary obstruction preventing a person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed, the offence under Section 341 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ is not attracted. The FIR is bereft of the essential ingredients required to constitute the alleged offences, and therefore the registration of the case itself amounts to an abuse of the process of law.

4. Ms. P.Akhila Naidu, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, in refutation of the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners, would contend that the allegations in the FIR clearly disclose the commission of cognizable offences. It is urged that the Petitioners, being political sympathizers, had deliberately congregated on a public thoroughfare and staged a Rasta Roko, thereby obstructing the free flow of traffic and causing inconvenience to the general public. Such conduct squarely attracts the mischief contemplated under Section 341 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ inasmuch as the voluntary obstruction of the road constitutes wrongful restraint within the meaning of Section 339 of ‘the I.P.C.’ Further, the act of forming an unlawful assembly and raising slogans in defiance of lawful authority amounts to disobedience of public order, thereby invoking Section 188 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ irrespective of whether a specific written order is produced, since the very nature of the act demonstrates conscious disregard of lawful directions intended to preserve public tranquillity. The learned Assistant Public Prosecutor would therefore submit that the FIR is not bereft of essent