Quashing of criminal proceedings is warranted when the FIR and charge sheet, even if accepted at face value, fail to establish a direct nexus, fraudulent inducement at the inception of a transaction, or the necessary ingredients of cheating and criminal conspiracy against the accused person.

ORDER :

Y. Lakshmana Rao, J.

Criminal Petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity, ‘the Cr.P.C.,’), seeking to quash the proceedings against the Petitioner/Accused No.3 in C.C.No.998 of 2022 on the file of the learned II Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Eluru.

2. Smt. Aishwarya Nagula, learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the foundational cornerstone of any criminal proceeding is the existence of specific, cogent, and legally sustainable allegations against the accused person sought to be proceeded against. A careful and dispassionate reading of the FIR No.97/2017 dated 08.05.2017, registered under Section 420 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ reveals with unmistakable clarity that there is not a single, solitary, direct or specific allegation levelled against the Petitioner herein, who is arrayed as Accused No.3. The de-facto Complainant, viz., the Respondent No.2 herein, has nowhere stated in the body of the complaint that the Petitioner directly approached him, made any false representation to him, induced him to part with any money, or entered into any transaction whatsoever with him. The Petitioner and Respondent No.2 are absolute strangers to each other, having had no dealings, correspondence, communication, or interaction of any nature whatsoever at any point of time. In these circumstances, the registration of the FIR naming the Petitioner as an accused is manifestly illegal, arbitrary, and wholly devoid of legal sanction.

3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner further submits that Section 420 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ prescribes three essential and cumulative ingredients that must be satisfied before any person can be brought within its ambit, namely: (i) deception of a person either by making a false or misleading representation or by dishonest concealment or by any other act or omission; (ii) fraudulent or dishonest inducement of that person to deliver any property or to consent to the retention thereof by any person, or intentional inducement of that person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and (iii) such act or omission causing or being likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation, or property. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that a single one of the aforesaid essential ingredients is made out even remotely against the Petitioner. There is no averment in the complaint, the charge sheet, or the statements of the witnesses recorded under Section 161(3) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ that the Petitioner ever made any representation, false, misleading, or otherwise, to the Respondent No.2, that the Petitioner ever induced Respondent No.2 directly or indirectly to part with any sum of money, or that Respondent No.2 ever came into contact with the Petitioner. Absent these foundational prerequisites, the offence under Section 420 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ is not attracted at all as against the Petitioner and the continuation of the proceedings is wholly untenable in law.

4. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner furthermore submits that the only manner in which the Petitioner’s name finds mention in the impugned complaint is by way of an indirect and highly suspicious reference to the effect that whenever Respondent No.2 demanded refund of the amount invested by him, the principal accused, viz., Accused Nos.1 and 2, would refer to the Petitioner over the telephone and represent that the money of Respondent No.2 was lying with the Petitioner who was doing online trading and that the same would be returned with high profits. It is submitted that this solitary telephonic reference by Accused Nos.1 and 2 to the Petitioner’s name, made during conversations between Accused Nos.1 & 2 and Respondent No.2, conversations to which the Petitioner was not privy, not a party, and in which the Petitioner never participated, cannot, by any stretch of legal imagination or judicial reasoning, be construed as constitu