A party may waive rights in immovable property through conduct or agreement, and compensation received during a parent's lifetime cannot be claimed by heirs post-death.

JUDGMENT :-

1) Appellant have filed this Appeal challenging the Decree dated 29 September 2022 passed by District Court, Panvel dismissing Regular Civil Appeal No.114 of 2019 (Old Regular Civil Appeal No.346 of 2012) and confirming the Decree passed by Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Panvel dated 30 July 2012 in Regular Civil Suit No.164 of 2000. By its decree, the Trial Court had dismissed Plaintiff’s suit seeking one-fourth share in Plot received from CIDCO under 12.5% scheme as well as her share in the amount of compensation received towards acquisition of the suit property. MANE SONALI DILIP 1/19 Digitally signed by MANE SONALI DILIP Date: 2024.05.10

2) Plaintiff and Defendant Nos.1 and 5 are siblings. Defendant No.2 is the wife of Plaintiff’s deceased brother late Hajimiya Patel and Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 are children of Defendant No.2. Plaintiff’s father late Fakir Abdul Rahiman Patel owned various lands as well as house properties at village Owe as more particular described in para 2 of the plaint. All the said properties of late Fakir Abdul Rahiman Patel came to be acquired by the State Government for establishment of Navi Mumbai, City and were handed over to City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra (CIDCO). Plaintiff averred in her Plaint that after acquisition of various lands, compensation was received during lifetime of her father and the entire proceedings relating to acquisition and compensation were looked after by her brother (Defendant No.1). That Plaintiff was not aware about the exact amount received by Defendant No.1 towards compensation and she guessed that the amount of compensation could be to the tune of Rs.7,00,000/-. She further claimed that enhanced compensation was also paid by the Land Acquisition Officer, accounts of which were available with the first Defendant.

3) Plaintiff further averred that a scheme was implemented by State Government for allotment of 12.5% plot in lieu of acquired land. That accordingly, towards acquired lands of her father, CIDCO allotted certain plot and that Defendant No.1 was in the process of selling the said plot received under 12.5% scheme by ignoring Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff claimed one-fourth share in such plot received under 12.5% scheme. On this cause of action, she instituted Regular Civil Suit No.164 of 2000 (Old Special Civil Suit No.119 of 1997). She claimed one-fourth share in plot received under 12.5% scheme and also claimed share in the amount of compensation.

4) It appears that during pendency of the suit, a Development Agreement came to be executed in October 2009 by Plaintiff, Defendant Nos. 1 and 5 in favour of M/s Paradise Group, under which development rights in respect of area admeasuring 4580 sq. mtrs. out of total area of 6870 sq. mtrs. was granted in favour of Paradise Group. The Agreement was executed on a premise that the entire family was to receive plot admeasuring 6870 sq. mtrs. under 12.5% scheme from CIDCO. However, since Defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 4 (heirs of deceased brither Hajimiya) were not party to the Development Agreement, their share of 2290 sq. mtrs. was kept aside and the Development Agreement was executed only in respect of area admeasuring 4580 sq. mtrs. The Agreement divided entitlements of Defendant No.1 as 2780 sq. mtrs., Plaintiff 900 sq. mtrs. and Defendant No.5 900 sq. mtrs. Accordingly, each party to the Development Agreement was paid consideration corresponding to their respective areas.

5) When Plaintiff’s suit came up for hearing, the Trial Court proceeded to dismiss the same by Judgment and Decree dated 30 July 2012 by referring to the Development Agreement. The Trial Court considered Muslim Law of Inheritance and held that Plaintiff was entitled to one-sixth share in the total area of 6870 sq. mtrs. received under 12.5% sq. mtrs. The Trial Court accordingly ascertained the share of Plaintiff at 1145 sq. mtrs. After referring to the Development Agreement, the Trial Court held that though Plaintiff