A party cannot rescind a contract while accepting its benefits; courts must consider all material evidence related to fraud and contract validity.

J U D G E M E N T :-

1. At the outset, I must mention that arguments in the above matter were concluded on 18th March 2021 and parties had also tendered detailed written submissions. However, due to the third wave of the COVID-19 pandemic and also other exigencies of work, there was a delay in pronouncing judgment in the above matter. I had, therefore, placed the matter on Board today (i.e. 16th March 2022) at 2:30 pm in chambers under the caption (cid:210)FOR DIRECTION/PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGEMENT(cid:211). I did this because almost a year has elapsed since the judgment was reserved, and I wanted to inquire from the parties if they wanted to make any further submissions. In these circumstances, I asked Mr. Chinoy, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner, as well as Mr. Dada, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent, if they wanted to make any further submissions or whether I should proceed to pronounce judgment in the above matter. Both counsels stated before me that notwithstanding the delay, they do not want to make any further submissions and I should proceed for pronouncing the judgment. Accordingly, I have pronounced the judgment today.

2. The above Petition is filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short (cid:210)the Arbitration Act(cid:211)) seeking to set aside the Majority Award of the Arbitral Tribunal dated 13th July 2020. The Majority Award is passed by Mrs. Justice Sujata Manohar (Retd.), a former Judge of the Supreme Court of India and Dr. Justice Mukundakam Sharma (Retd.), also a former Judge of the Supreme Court. The dissenting Award dated 20th July 2020 is given by a former Judge of the Supreme Court of India, Mr. Justice S. S. Nijjar (Retd).

3. By the Majority Award, the Petitioner(cid:213)s challenge to the Respondent(cid:213)s rescission of the Petitioner(cid:213)s 2nd Media Rights License Agreement dated 25th March 2009 (for short, the (cid:210)2nd BCCI-WSGI MRLA(cid:211)) was rejected. Under the 2nd BCCI-WSGI MRLA, the Petitioner was granted Media Rights in relation to the Indian Premier League (for short the (cid:210)IPL(cid:211)) for the (cid:210)Rest of the World(cid:211) ((cid:210)RoW(cid:211)) territories (i.e. all territories other than the Indian Sub-Continent), for the period 2009- 2017. In the Majority Award, the Arbitrators upheld that the said rescission of the 2nd BCCI-WSGI MRLA by accepting the Respondent(cid:213)s contention that the said MRLA was part of a fraudulent composite transaction. Since the said MRLA was part of a composite fraud, the Respondent’s rescission of the said MRLA was upheld by the Majority Award.

4. Before I advert to the facts of the case, it would be necessary to set out the description of the parties. The Petitioner, World Sports Group (India) Private Limited (for short (cid:210)WSGI(cid:211)) is a company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 . It was part of the World Sports Group of companies which was subsequently acquired by the Lagardere Group which is engaged in the business of sports marketing, event management and media rights, specifically in relation to cricket, golf, and football. The Respondent, the Board of Control for Cricket in India (for short (cid:210)BCCI(cid:211)) is a society registered under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Registration of Societies Act, 1975 and is the governing body for the sport of cricket in India. In fact, BCCI organizes cricket matches in India and abroad. For the sake of convenience, I shall refer to the Petitioner as (cid:210)WSGI(cid:211) and the Respondent as (cid:210)BCCI(cid:211).

5. The facts to be noted to decide the present controversy are this. In September 2007, BCCI conceptualized and decided to launch the Indian Premier League (for short the (cid:210)IPL(cid:211)) which was the first of its kind, franchise-based, 20-over cricket tournament. The format of the IPL differed from the then existing structure of