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2023 Supreme(Online)(Bom) 3298

HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
MANISH PITALE, J
Tata Motors Finance Solutions Limited – Appellant
Versus
Naushad Khan c/o. Nazbul Hoda Khan – Respondent
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO.8654 OF 2022 | COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION APPLICATION (L) NO.3908 OF 2023 | COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO.25821 OF 2022



Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Mr. Chetan Kapadia, Ms. Vidisha Rohiya, Ms. Ami Brahmbhatt, Ms. Bhavna Dube Patil, Dr. Abhinav Chandrachud, Mr. Gaurav Jangle, Ms. Kunjita Shah
For the Respondents: Ms. Anita Castellino, Ms. Vibha Mishra, Mr. Mehul Thakkar, Md. Jamil Khan, Ms. Zia Sayed, Mr. Kevin Gala, Ms. Jayshri Chavan

The existence of an arbitration clause permits financial institutions to seek arbitration for dispute resolution despite being subject to statutory remedies under the SARFAESI Act.

Headnote:(A) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Sections 9 and 11 - Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 - Jurisdictional objections raised regarding arbitration by financial institution; court held that the petitioner, although a financial institution under SARFAESI Act, retains right to arbitration despite the existence of statutory remedies. Respondents' argument rejected as the SARFAESI Act concerns enforcement while arbitration governs adjudication. (Paras 1, 13, 24, 28, 38-41)

(B) Legal principles of arbitration - The existence of an arbitration clause does not preclude the institution's ability to resort to arbitration despite conflicts with other regulatory frameworks. The court emphasized that the SARFAESI Act is complementary to arbitration settings, and disputes can co-exist within both frameworks. (Paras 24, 30, 34)

Facts of the case:
The petitioner, a financial institution, sought arbitration for loan recovery from the respondents after defaults occurred in repayments and objected to jurisdiction raised by respondents on basis of SARFAESI Act which they claimed barred arbitration despite existing arbitration clauses in agreements (Paras 3, 4, 14).

Findings of Court:
The Court found that arbitration proceedings are permissible and valid despite the respondents' objections. The petitions under Section 9 were partially allowed granting interim measures for the protection of the petitioner's interests. (Para 40)

Issues: The case addressed whether arbitration is barred when statutory remedy is available to a financial institution under SARFAESI Act and if arbitration proceedings can coexist with SARFAESI enforcement processes. (Paras 1, 18, 39)

Ratio Decidendi: The Court noted that the SARFAESI Act provisions concerning enforcement do not impede the adjudicatory role of arbitration, thus reaffirming that arbitration can serve as a forum for dispute resolution involving financial institutions. Ensured that any invocation of SARFAESI Act should follow a determination of the debt via arbitration first. (Paras 3, 19, 28)

Result: Jurisdictional objections were rejected and interim measures were granted to the petitioner.

ORDER :

. The respondents in these proceedings have raised a fundamental objection regarding jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the two petitions filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) and an application under Section 11 thereof, on the ground that the petitioner - applicant in these proceedings is a 'financial institution' covered under the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act), further claiming that the petitioner ought to proceed under the SARFAESI Act and that the remedy of arbitration cannot be invoked by the petitioner at all.

2. The respondents claim that the petitioner ought to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) by invoking the provisions of the SARFAESI Act and that the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Vidya Drolia and others Vs. Durga Trading Corporation reported in (2021) 2 SCC 1, makes it amply clear that in the face of the statutory remedy with special tribunal available to the petitioner, resort to arbitration proceedings is barred, notwithstanding an arbitration clause contained in the agreement executed between the parties.

3. Brief reference to facts would give the backdrop in which the present proceedings have been initiated. The petitioner had advanced loan facilities to the respondents for purchase of vehicles and accordingly, Loan-cum-Hypothecation-cum-Guarantee Agreements were executed between the petitioner and the respondents. Each of the agreements contained an arbitration clause, which reads as follows:-

“21. Arbitration

21.1. All disputes differences and / or claims arising out of this Agreement or as to the construction, meaning or effect hereof or as to the rights and liabilities of the parties hereunder shall be settled by arbitration to be held in Mumbai in accordance with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, or any statutory amendments thereof and shall be referred to a sole arbitrator to be appointed by the Lender. In the event of death, refusal, neglect, inability or incapability of the person so appointed to act as an arbitrator, the Lender may appoint a new arbitrator. The proceedings will be conducted in English. The award of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on parties concerned.”

4. The loan amounts were secured by way of hypothecation of vehicles in respect of which the loan amounts were advanced. The petitioner claims that although, initially, the respondents did make payment of installments, but subsequently, they started committing defaults. The parties entered into correspondence regarding repayment of outstanding amounts by the respondents. When the petitioner noticed that one of the vehicles was sold by the respondents, the petitioner was constrained to invoke the arbitration clause. Since the petitioner apprehended that the respondents would continue using the vehicles despite committing defaults and the vehicles may even be disposed off, the present petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and the application under Section 11 thereof were filed before this Court.

5. The respondents appeared and resisted the prayers made in the petition and in the application. The aforementioned fundamental objection regarding jurisdiction was raised, on the basis of which, the respondents prayed for dismissal at the threshold of the petitions and the application.

6. Since the respondents raised objection of jurisdiction, going to the very root of the matter, this Court is referring to the arguments made on behalf of the respondents first and then reference would be made to the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner.

7. Ms. Anita Castellino, learned counsel appearing for the respondents in the petition as well as in the application submitted that the petitioner was notified as a financial institution by the central government under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act by issuing notification dated 27.08.20

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