ORAL JUDGMENT : { Per Sunil B. Shukre, J.}

1. RULE. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of learned counsel for the petitioner, learned counsel for respondent no.2 and learned APP for the respondent-State.

2. With the assistance of learned counsel for the petitioner and learned APP for the respondent-State, we have gone through the FIR and the other material available on record, which is forming part of the paper-book of this petition.

3. We are of the view that the allegations made in the FIR, when taken at their face-value, do not, in any manner, constitute the offence punishable under Section 186 of the IPC. These allegations, when accepted as they are, also do not indicate commission of any offence as is contemplated under Sections 43(f) and 66 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.

4. In order to constitute any offence punishable under Section 186 of the IPC, it is necessary that there must be a public servant who is voluntarily obstructed by another in discharge of his public functions and such obstruction must have direct connection with the discharge of public functions of such public servant. This offence would also indicate that it is for the public servant who has been obstructed in discharge of his public functions to voluntarily come forward and allege the obstruction.

5. In the present case, the alleged obstruction has been caused to a public servant by name Smt. Ashwini Bhide, a Member of the Indian Administrative Service, who was at the relevant time working as Managing Director of Mumbai Metro Rail Corporation, which corporation was then engaged in construction of a car-shed in the land belonging to Aarey Dairy and this work envisaged cutting of several trees. The allegation is that certain messages were received on the official cell phone of Smt. Ashwini Bhide, due to which she felt offended and obstructed in discharge of her official functions and when she blocked the number from which she had received those messages, Smt. Ashwini Bhide received some messages from a different mobile number. This is how, in the opinion of the complainant i.e. respondent no.2, Smt. Ashwini Bhide was obstructed in discharge of her public functions. But, Smt. Ashwini Bhide does not herself come forward and make any such allegations. The complainant, i.e. respondent no.2, has not stated in his FIR that he had received information regarding commission of the said offence directly from Smt. Ashwini Bhide. There is nothing on record which shows that Smt. Ashwini Bhide had written to the respondent no.2 and informed him about the alleged obstruction being caused to her by the person sending messages to her from certain mobile number, which is alleged to be belonging to the petitioner. No efforts to find out the source of information of respondent no.2 regarding commission of this cognizable offence has been made by the Investigating Officer and, therefore, it is still not known as to whether or not there was any such information available as was sufficient to disclose commission of a cognizable offence so necessary for registration of the FIR in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

6. Apart from what is stated above, we find that the alleged offending messages, when understood as they are, without adding anything thereto or subtracting anything therefrom, do not by themselves show that the sender of those messages had at any point of time intended to obstruct Smt. Ashwini Bhide or had any knowledge that by those messages, he would create the effect of obstructing Smt. Ashwini Bhide from discharging her public functions. These messages show at their face-value that the sender of the messages was the person who had intention to make efforts for preservation of the trees in the larger interest of society. He had stated in those messages that Aarey Forest was a green lung for the city of Mumbai just as Cubbon Park is for the city of Bangalore and, therefore, he has pleaded with Smt. Ashw