The court clarified that exceptional circumstances may allow for the condonation of delay in filing appeals when sufficient causes are demonstrated.

DATED : 28 July 2025 ORAL ORDER:-(Per M. S. Sonak, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. Rule. The Rule is made returnable immediately at the request of and with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties.

3. The challenge in this petition pertains to the order dated 19/20 August 2024, by which the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) dismissed the Petitioner’s appeal on the grounds that it was filed after tthhee 6600--ddaayy lliimmiittaattiioonn ppeerriioodd.. TThhee CCoommmmiissssiioonneerr aallssoo nnootteedd tthhaatt although the appeal was lodged within the condonable period of 30 days, no explanation was provided, and no sufficient cause was demonstrated.

4. Mr. Dingankar, learned counsel for the Petitioner, explained tthhaatt tthhee AAddvvooccaattee wwhhoo aappppeeaarreedd ffoorr tthhee PPeettiittiioonneerr bbeeffoorree tthhee AAppppeellllaattee Authority was unwell and, therefore, missed filing the application for condonation of delay. However, Mr. Dingankar submitted that there was sufficient cause for this unintentional omission on the part of the Petitioner's Advocate, and the Petitioner should not be made to suffer. He submitted that substantial justice would require the Petitioner to be afforded an additional opportunity to explain the delay, particularly because the appeal was admittedly filed within the condonable period of 30 days provided under the statute. He submitted that since the appeal was filed within 90 days, the previous Advocate was unsure whether any such application is necessary.

5. Mr. Dingankar, based on instructions from the Petitioner, submitted that the Petitioner would pay costs up to Rs. 2,00,000/-if the Petitioner was given an additional opportunity. He submitted that this would offset any prejudice to the Respondents i.e. the State authorities. 6. Mr. Adik, learned counsel for the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, submitted that no application for condonation of delay was ever filed, and further, even in this petition, no explanation is offered for the delay. He, therefore, submitted that there was no error in the impugned order dismissing the appeal by invoking the bar of limitation. Mr. Dubey, who holds for Mr. Mishra, adopts Mr. Adik’s contentions and urges that this petition may be dismissed.

7. The rival contentions now fall for our determination.

8. The Order-in-Original in this case was made on 28 December

2022 and communicated on 29 December 2022.

9. Section 128 of the Customs Act , 1962 provides that any person aggrieved by an order made under this Act by an officer of customs lower in rank than the Principal Commissioner of Customs or Commissioner of Customs may appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals) within sixty days from the date of the communication to him of such decision or order. The proviso to Section 128 (1), however, provides that the Commissioner (Appeals) may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of sixty days, allow it to be presented within a further period of thirty days subject to “sufficient cause” being shown.

10. Thus, the primary rule is the presentation of an appeal within 60 days from the date of communication of the impugned order. However, the Appellate Authority is empowered to condone a delay of up to 30 days.

11. In the present case, the Order-in-Original was communicated to the Petitioner on 29 December 2022. After excluding this date, the appeal filed on 29 March 2023 could be said to have been filed on the 90^th day, i.e. within the delay condonable period of 30 days from the expiry of the first 60 days.

12. The Petitioner should have filed a formal application for condonation of delay showing sufficient cause. Howe