IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 8506 OF 2021

WITH

INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 1310 OF 2021

WITH

INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 1311 OF 2021

IN

FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 8506 OF 2021

The Executive Engineer, Nandur Madhyameshwar ..Appellant/

Project, Nashik Applicant

Versus

Sushilabai Mahadu Pagar & ors. ..Respondents

WITH

FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 8988 OF 2021

WITH

INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 2187 OF 2021

WITH

INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 2188 OF 2021

IN

FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 8988 OF 2021

The Executive Engineer, Nandur Madhyameshwar ..Appellant/

Project, Nashik Applicant

Versus

Sushilabai Mahadu Pagar & ors. ..Respondents

Ms. Chaitrali Deshmukh, Advocate, for the Appellant in FA(St.) Nos. 8506 of 2021 and 8988 of 2021 and for the Applicant in IA Nos.

1310 & 1311 of 2021 and IA Nos. 2187 & 2188 of 2021

Mr. A. R. Patil, Addl. GP, for the State

Mr. Amar Kazi i/b. Mr. Sachin Gite, Advocates, for Respondent

Nos. 1 to 5

CORAM : RAJESH S. PATIL, J.

DATE : 10.12.2025

P. C.

INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 1310 OF 2021

1. This Interim Application has been filed for condonation of delay in filing the First Appeal.

2. I have heard learned Counsel for the respective parties and gone through the contents of the Interim Application. According to me, a case is made out to allow the present Interim Application.

3. Supreme Court in the judgment of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another Vs. Mst. Katji and Others reported in 1987 SC

1353, has held that:

“Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every house’s delay. Every second’s delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.”

4. Supreme Court in the case of S. Ganesharaju (Dead) through Lrs V. Narasamma (Dead) through Lrs reported in (2013) 11 SCC 341, more specifically, paragraph Nos. 12 and 13, of the said judgment held that a liberal construction to the cause of delay should be given. The said paragraphs are reproduced herein below:

12. The expression “sufficient cause” as appearing in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has to be given a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. Unless the respondents are able to show malafides in not approaching the court within the period of limitation, generally as a normal rule, delay should be condoned. The trend of the courts while dealing with the matter with regard to condonation of delay has tilted more towards condoning delay and directing the parties to contest the matter on merits, meaning thereby that such technicalities have been given go-by.

13. The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy or foreclose the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly.

5. Bombay High Court in the judgment of Kamalbai Narasaiyya Shrimal and Another Vs. Ganpat Vithalrao Gavare reported in 2007 (1)

MH. L.J. 807, paragraph Nos.13 and 15 has held:

13. The factual position is manifestly clear on bare perusal of the application for condonation filed by the petitioners before the learned District Judge. The only relevant statement in the application is thus:

“The delay caused in preferring the appeal is of six months. The caused delay is not intentional one. The appellants are poor and helpless persons. If the delay is not condoned appellant may cause irreparable loss which cannot be compensated in terms of money. The suit was for recovery of possession and present appellants are tenants. If the delay is not condoned then appellants will become shelterless.”

15. The expression “sufficient cause” cannot be erased from section of the Limitation Act by adopting excessive liberal approach which would defeat the very purpose of section 5 of the Limitation Act. There must be some cause which can be termed as a sufficient one for the purpose of delay condonation. I do not find any such “sufficient cause” stated in the application and as such no interference in the impugned order is called for.”

6. C