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2025 Supreme(Online)(Bom) 248499

HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE RAJESH S. PATIL
JINDAS GULABCHAND HUNDIA AND ANR. – Appellant
Versus
UNION OF INDIA MINISTRY OF CIVIL AVIATIONSHRI SHANKRA NAND BHARTI AND ORS. – Respondent
FAST/95225/2020



IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 95225 OF 2020

WITH

INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 14868 OF 2023

Jindas Gulabchand Hundia (since deceased) ..Appellants

ANAND

through legal heirs & anr.

SUDHAKAR

Versus

SUDAME

Union of India & ors. ..Respondents

WITH

Digitally signed

INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 7316 OF 2025

by ANAND

IN

SUDHAKAR

FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 95225 OF 2020

SUDAME

Date: 2025.12.24

Rakesh Kumar Hundia Jain & ors. ..Applicants

19:33:51 +0530

IN THE MATTER BETWEEN

Jindas Gulabchand Hundia (since deceased) ..Appellants

through legal heirs & anr.

Versus

Union of India & ors. ..Respondents

Mr. Ajinkya Udane, Advocate, for the Appellants

Mr. Anil Kumar Singh i/b. Mr. D. P. Singh, Advocates, for Respondent

No.1

Mr. Rakesh Singh i/b. M/s. M. V. Kini & Co., Advocate, for Respondent

No. 2

Mr. Mayur Sonawane, AGP, for the Respondent – State

CORAM : RAJESH S. PATIL, J.

DATE : 17.12.2025

P. C.

INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 14868 OF 2023

1. This Interim Application has been filed for condonation of delay of 175 days in filing the First Appeal.

2 The First Appeal challenges the Award dated 21.01.2020 and the First Appeal along with Delay Condonation Application were filed on

12.10.2020.

3. Supreme Court in the judgment of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another Vs. Mst. Katji and Others reported in 1987 SC

1353, has held that:

“Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every house’s delay. Every second’s delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.”

4. Supreme Court in the case of S. Ganesharaju (Dead) through Lrs V. Narasamma (Dead) through Lrs reported in (2013) 11 SCC 341, more specifically, paragraph Nos. 12 and 13, of the said judgment held that a liberal construction to the cause of delay should be given. The said paragraphs are reproduced herein below:

12. The expression “sufficient cause” as appearing in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has to be given a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. Unless the respondents are able to show malafides in not approaching the court within the period of limitation, generally as a normal rule, delay should be condoned. The trend of the courts while dealing with the matter with regard to condonation of delay has tilted more towards condoning delay and directing the parties to contest the matter on merits, meaning thereby that such technicalities have been given go-by.

13. The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy or foreclose the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly.

5. Bombay High Court in the judgment of Kamalbai Narasaiyya Shrimal and Another Vs. Ganpat Vithalrao Gavare reported in 2007 (1)

MH. L.J. 807, paragraph Nos.13 and 15 has held:

13. The factual position is manifestly clear on bare perusal of the application for condonation filed by the petitioners before the learned District Judge. The only relevant statement in the application is thus:

“The delay caused in preferring the appeal is of six months. The caused delay is not intentional one. The appellants are poor and helpless persons. If the delay is not condoned appellant may cause irreparable loss which cannot be compensated in terms of money. The suit was for recovery of possession and present appellants are tenants. If the delay is not condoned then appellants will become shelterless.”

15. The expression “sufficient cause” cannot be erased from section of the Limitation Act by adopting excessive liberal approach which would defeat the very purpose of section 5 of the Limitation Act. There must be some cause which can be termed as a sufficient one for the purpose of delay condonation. I do not find any such “sufficient cause” stated in the application and as such no interference in the impugned order is called for.”

6. Considering the facts of the present case and the law laid down in the above Judgments, I am convinced that

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