P.C.

1. Today’s board listing this case was notified four days back (i.e. on 17 January 2025). It is informed to us that the arguing counsel for the petitioners has not filed a leave note, however an application for adjournment is made, which in the fact situation ought not to be entertained. The respondents are all represented who have contentions to advance on the issues as involved.

2. We have perused paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 of the petition, we have a serious doubt on the locus of the petitioners and more particularly of

petitioner nos.2 to 7 to pursue the present proceedings. Let the petitioners address the Court on their locus. Also the verification to the petition which is by one Mr. Anil Dattatray Karnik does not bring about any clarity in regard to petitioner nos.2 to 7, being in any manner concerned with petitioner no.1-Seawoods Estates Ltd. This more particularly that petitioner nos.2 to 7 are not residents of Seawoods Estates Ltd. in respect of which a grievance as sought to be made.

3. Today by an order passed by this Court on Interim Application No. 10251 of 2024, we had permitted intervention of Ms. Leela Varma, who is now the added respondent in the writ petition.

4. Ms. Sonawane, learned counsel for the added respondent submits that substantive orders were passed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in an earlier writ petition filed by petitioner no.1-Seawoods Estates Ltd. (Writ Petition No. 9513 of 2021) which came to be disposed of along with the companion matters by a judgment dated 20 March 2023. She states that the Court had considered the issues of feeding of the dogs in the petitioner no.1’s premises and that there is nothing illegal in the added respondent doing so. She submits that even Rule 20 of the impugned Rules provides for “Feeding of Community Animals” was subject matter of consideration

in the Court passing such orders. In such context, the Court in paragraph 13 had made the following observations:-

“13. There is at least some law in this country that the fundamental constitutional safeguards guaranteed by the Constitution must be held to vest even in non-human. See: Karnail Singh & Ors v State of Haryana,¹ in the context of a cow smuggling case expressly recognizing that the entire animal kingdom has a distinct legal persona with corresponding rights of a living person. In Animal Welfare Board of India v A Nagaraja & Ors,² the Supreme Court considered inter alia the ambit of the PCA and the Constitutional mandate. It held:

“72. Every species has a right to life and security, subject to the law of the land, which includes depriving its life, out of human necessity. Article 21 of the Constitution, while safeguarding the rights of humans, protects life and the word “life” has been given an expanded definition and any disturbance from the basic environment which includes all forms of life, including animal life, which are necessary for human life, fall within the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution. So far as animals are concerned, in our view, “life” means something more than mere survival or existence or instrumental value for human beings, but to lead a life with some intrinsic worth, honour and dignity. Animals’ well-being and welfare have been statutorily recognised under Sections 3 and 11 of the Act and the rights framed under the Act. Right to live in a healthy and clean atmosphere and right to get protection from human beings against inflicting unnecessary pain or suffering is a right guaranteed to the animals under Sections 3 and 11 of the PCA Act read with Article 51-A(g) of the Constitution. Right to get food, shelter is also a guaranteed right under Sections 3 and 11 of the PCA Act and the Rules framed thereunder, especially when they are domesticated. The right to dignity and fair treatment is, therefore, not confined to human beings alone, but to animals as well. The right, not to be beaten, kicked, overridden, overloaded is also a right recognised by Section 11 read with Section 3 of t