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2026 Supreme(Online)(Bom) 3671

HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Amit Borkar, J
President, Adarsh Vidya Prasarak Sanstha – Appellant
Versus
Savita Gajanan Fatake – Respondent
WRIT PETITION NO.2014 OF 2008|WRIT PETITION NO.2020 OF 2008|WRIT PETITION NO.2021 OF 2008



Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Devendranath Joshi
For the Respondents: Mihir Desai, Sanskriti Yagnik, Dhruti Kapadia

A temporary appointment does not automatically convert to a probationary status merely because it is made against a permanent vacancy or performed satisfactorily. Parties are bound by the explicit contractual terms of the appointment, unless the employee proves the temporary designation was a sham or colourable exercise of power.

Headnote:(A) Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act - Section 9 - Constitution of India - Articles 226 and 227 - Temporary appointment versus probation - Engagement against a permanent vacancy does not automatically grant the status of probation - Parties remain bound by the terms of the appointment order - Burden of proof to demonstrate that a temporary appointment is a camouflage or facade rests on the employee - Principles stated in paragraphs 8, 11, 16, and 18.

(B) Appellate jurisdiction - Scope - Interference with the discretion of the management is permissible only in cases of perversity, lack of bona fides, or colourable exercise of power - A quasi-judicial body cannot sit as a selection authority or substitute its own satisfaction for the management’s assessment of candidate suitability - Judicial review is limited to examining the legality and process of the decision-making. (Paras 13, 15)

Facts of the case:
The petitioners challenged the order of a quasi-judicial body which had deemed the appointments of teachers as probationary rather than temporary. The employees contended that because they were appointed against permanent vacancies and rendered satisfactory service, they obtained a legal right to continuity. The petitioners argued that the appointments were strictly contractual and temporary as per the specific terms of the appointment letters.

Findings of Court:
The court determined that the explicit contractual terms of an appointment letter are binding and govern the service relationship. The existence of a permanent vacancy or the satisfactory performance of duties does not automatically transform a temporary engagement into one of probation. The management is empowered to make temporary appointments as an interim arrangement, provided the decision is exercised in good faith and supported by contemporaneous records.

Issues: Whether an appointment made against a permanent vacancy implies a deemed probationary status; whether the quasi-judicial tribunal erred in disregarding the explicit contractual stipulations of the appointment order.

Ratio Decidendi: Absent clear evidence of a sham or a colourable exercise of power, the explicit terms of an appointment letter must be given effect. A tribunal cannot ignore these terms or presume a probationary status simply because the underlying vacancy was permanent, as there is no statutory fiction that mandates such conversion.

Result: Petitions allowed; impugned orders set aside.

Table of Content
1. procedural history of the dispute regarding termination of services. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4)
2. conflicting contentions regarding temporary versus probationary employment status. (Para 5 , 6)
3. contractual terms strictly govern the nature of employment. (Para 7 , 8 , 9 , 10)
4. management power requires bona fide exercise and contemporaneous record-keeping. (Para 11 , 12 , 13)
5. tribunal jurisdiction limited to examining legality and bona fide exercise. (Para 14 , 15)
6. no presumption exists that permanent vacancy implies probation. (Para 16 , 17 , 18)
7. final adjudication allowing petition and setting aside orders. (Para 19)

wp2014-2008 & connected-J.doc

AGK

CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.

RESERVED ON : APRIL 10, 2026.

PRONOUNCED ON : APRIL 16, 2026

JUDGMENT:

1. Since the question of law arising for consideration in all the present writ petitions is common and interconnected, the same are being disposed of by this common judgment. For the sake of convenience and in order to avoid repetition of facts, the factual matrix in Writ Petition No.2014 of 2008 is taken as the lead matter for adjudication.

2. By way of the present writ petition instituted under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have assailed the legality, correctness, and propriety of the Judgment and Order dated 14 December 2007 passed by the learned School Tribunal, Navi Mumbai in Appeal Nos. 24 of 2007, 26 of 2007, and 40 of 2007.

3. The facts giving rise to the filing of the present writ petition, as set out by the petitioners, are that Respondent No. 1 in each of the writ petitions came to be appointed as an Assistant Teacher in Adarsha Vidyalaya Mandir, a school managed and conducted by Petitioner No. 1, during the year 2005. It is the case of the petitioners that though Respondent No. 1 repeatedly requested issuance of a formal order of appointment, no separate appointment order was issued in her favour. It is further the case that by communication dated 27 March 2007, Respondent No. 1 was informed that her services stood discontinued upon conclusion of the academic year. Thereafter, Respondent No. 1 was not reappointed for the subsequent academic session of 2007 to 2008. Treating the action of the petitioners in not reappointing her for the said academic year as amounting to an order of termination, respondent No. 1 instituted an appeal in the year 2007 before the School Tribunal, Navi Mumbai, challenging the alleged termination dated 27 March 2007. In the said proceedings, the petitioners entered appearance and filed their reply resisting the appeal, inter alia contending that the appointment of respondent No. 1 in Adarsha Vidya Mandir was purely temporary in nature and made only for a limited duration. It was further contended that on the basis of such temporary appointment, respondent No. 1 had acquired no legal right either to claim continuation in service or to seek continuation in the school establishment.

4. The learned School Tribunal, upon hearing the parties, by its Judgment and Order dated 14 December 2007, recorded a finding that the appointment of Respondent No. 1 was in the nature of an appointment on probation and, therefore, her services could not have been dispensed with without adherence to the prescribed statutory procedure. On the basis of the aforesaid findings and observations, the learned Tribunal allowed the appeals preferred by Respondent No. 1. Being aggrieved thereby, the petitioners have approached this Court by way of the present writ petitions.

5. Mr. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, submits that the learned School Tribunal failed to properly appreciate the nature of appointment of Respondent No. 1 and erroneously treated the same as an appointment on probation, despite the clear position that the appointment was purely temporary in character. It is his submission that a temporary employee does not acquire any vested right either to hold the post or to seek continuation in

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