The Court : Learned counsel for the award-debtors raises an objection as to jurisdiction of this Court to take up the matter and the maintainability of the execution case. On maintainability, it is argued that a previous application filed for execution of the self-same award had been dismissed for default.

It is pointed out that both in the Tabular Statement as well as the averments in the execution petition, the award-holder has wrongly sought to mislead this Court by averring that the previous execution case was withdrawn, whereas the order annexed to the application itself shows that the same was dismissed for non-prosecution.

Learned counsel for the award-holder also takes the court to the relevant paragraph of the affidavit in support of the execution petition where the relevant paragraph averring that the previous execution case was withdrawn has been affirmed to the effect that it is true to knowledge derived from the arbitrator. As such, on such score alone, the present application ought to be dismissed, both for misleading the Court as well as due to the bar envisaged under Order 21 Rules 105 and 106 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Learned counsel further points out that Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 itself provides that the procedure applicable to the execution of the decree is also attracted in case of Section 36.

As regards territoriality, learned counsel for the award-debtors submits that it is an admitted position that the award was passed in Mumbai, which was also the seat of the arbitral proceeding.

Also, the award-debtors reside outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court in its original jurisdiction. Such position appears from the cause title of the application itself and as such, this Court cannot come within the ambit of “Court” as defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act.

Learned counsel for the award holder, while controverting such arguments, cites Bhagyoday Cooperative Bank Limited Vs. Ravindra Balkrishna Patel deceased through his legal representatives And Others. reported at (2022) 14 SCC 417, where it was held by the Supreme Court that the mere dismissal of a first execution application on the ground of default may not result in the decree-holder being precluded from filing a fresh execution petition, provided it is within time.

Learned counsel also relies on Sundaram Finance Limited Vs. Abdul Samad And Another reported in (2018) 3 SCC 622, where it was observed by the Supreme Court that an award under Section 36 of the 1996 Act is equated to a decree of the Court for the purposes of execution and only for that purpose.

Thus, while an award passed by the arbitral tribunal is deemed to be a decree under Section 36 of the 1996 Act, there is no deeming fiction anywhere to hold that the Court within whose jurisdiction the arbitral award is passed should be taken to be the Court which passed the decree. It was further held that the 1996 Act actually transcends all territorial barriers.

It is also argued that as per the averments in the present execution application itself, the loan agreement was entered into within the territorial jurisdiction of the Original Side of this Court.

That apart, it is disclosed in the affidavit of assets of the award-debtors that some of the assets lie within the territorial jurisdiction of the vicinity of their residence.

On such ground as well, since the assets are apprehended to be at present within the territorial jurisdiction of the Original Side of this Court, the execution application is very much maintainable before this Court.

With regard to the first objection, as to the maintainability of this application in view of the dismissal of the prior execution case, the award- debtor is justified in arguing that the award-holder could have done well to point out before this Court in the Tabular Statement as well as in its averments in the application that the previous execution petition was not withdrawn, with or without liberty to file afresh, but w