Jurisdiction under tax law involves strict adherence to specific procedures established for issuing notices, ensuring compliance with the statutory provisions and existing Circulars.

1.07.2025 Item No.02 In the High Court at Calcutta Court No.01 Circuit Bench at Jalpaiguri SK(AR(CR))

MAT/112/2024 IA NO: CAN/1/2024 RAJIB PAUL VS UNION OF INDIA AND ORS Mr. Nirmalya Chakraborty, Mr. Promit Majumdar, Ms. Rinka Chakraborty, ……for the appellant.

Mr. Sudipto Kumar Mazumdar, Mr. Ajoy Kumar Singhania, …..for Income Tax The grievance of the petitioner is directed against a notice dated 15 March, 2024 issued under section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 .

It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that the impugned notice has been passed in contravention of the Circular dated 29 March, 2022 issued under Section 151A (1)(2) of the Act. It is also contended that the entire scheme of the Act contemplates proceedings being conducted through faceless mode. Accordingly, the respondent authorities have no jurisdiction to issue the impugned notice and all consequential steps are non est and are liable to be stayed. In support of such contention, the appellant relies on the decisions in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. vs Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax , [2024] 464 ITR 430 (Bombay) , Aristo Pharmaceuticals (P.) Ltd. Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax [2024] 167 Taxmann.com 315 (Bombay), and Sri Venkataramana Reddy Patloola Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle1(1), Hyderabad & Ors. 2024 SCC OnLine TS 1792.

On behalf of the respondent authorities, it is fairly submitted that the issue raised in this writ petition is pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In any event there is a contrary view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Rajesh Kumar Dugar Vs. Union of India & Ors. (unreported decision in MAT/162/2023 dated December 19, 2023). In such view of the matter there is no merit in the writ petition and the same is liable to be dismissed.

Admittedly, the appeal has been filed against an ad interim order dated 2 December, 2024. Significantly, by the said order the respondent authorities were also directed to file a Report. This has admittedly not been done till date. In this regard, the respondent authorities pray for an extension of time to file the Report before the Trial Court.

The short question raised in this appeal is one of jurisdiction exercised under section 148 of the Act read with section 151 of the Act. In Hexaware Technologies Ltd. (Supra), it has been held as follows;

“35. Further, in our view, there is no question of concurrent jurisdiction of the JAO and the FAO for issuance of notice under section 148 of the Act or even for passing assessment or reassessment order. When specific jurisdiction has been assigned to either the JAO or the FAO in the Scheme dated 29th March, 2022, then it is to the exclusion of the other. To take any other view in the matter, would not only result in chaos but also render the whole faceless proceedings redundant. If the argument of Revenue is to be accepted, then even when notices reissued by the FAO, it would be open to an assessee to make submission before the JAO and vice versa, which is clearly not contemplated in the Act. Therefore, there is no question of concurrent jurisdiction of both FAO and the JAO with respect to the issuance of notice under section 148 of the Act. The Scheme dated 29th March 2022 in paragraph 3 clearly provides that the issuance of notice "shall be through automated allocation" which means that the same is mandatory and is required to be followed by the Department and does not give any discretion to the Department to choose whether to follow it or not. That automated allocation is defined in paragraph 2(b) of the Scheme to mean an algorithm for randomised allocation of cases by using suitable technological tools including artificial intelligence and machine learning with a view to optimize the use of resources. Therefore, it means that the case can be allocated randomly to any officer who would then have jurisdiction to issue the notice under section 148 of the Act. It is not the case of respondent no. 1 that respondent no. 1 was the r