A compromise decree regarding immovable property does not require registration if solely relating to the suit property, and prior judicial findings on title are binding.

1. The present appeal has been preferred against a judgment of affirmance. The plaintiffs/appellants filed the suit for declaration of their title and ancillary reliefs.

2. The plinth of the plaint case for asserting the claim of title to the property by the plaintiffs is three fold:-

(i) On the basis of a previous compromise decree passed in a second appeal, in which the present defendants/respondents were parties as proforma defendants/respondents and the present plaintiffs/appellants and their father were parties as principal defendants/appellants, where the plaintiffs therein had admitted the title of the present plaintiffs;

(ii) On the strength of a deed of gift executed by Dulal Chandra Nandi, the predecessor-in-interest of the present defendants/respondents, in favour of the plaintiffs/appellants;

(iii) In the alternative, adverse possession.

3. Both the courts below, in the present lis, held that the compromise decree could not per se confer any title on the plaintiffs/appellants, since it was not a registered deed of transfer. Insofar as the title deed executed by Dulal Chandra Nandi is concerned, both the courts below came to the concurrent finding that the said issue was barred by res judicata between the present plaintiffs and the present defendants, since it was held by the trial court and the first appellate court in the previous suit that the said gift deed did not confer any title on the present plaintiffs, as the vendor himself did not have any title in the said property. The second appeal at the previous instance, it is to be noted, was recorded by the courts below to have been dismissed as against the proforma defendants therein, that is, the present defendants/respondents.

4. In any event, it is an admitted position that the present defendants/respondents, who were proforma defendants in the previous suit, were not signatories to the compromise decree arrived at in the previous second appeal.

5. Learned senior counsel for the appellants argues that under Section 17 (2) of the Registration Act, 1908 , a decree of a court is not compulsorily registrable unless the decree is a compromise decree pertaining to immovable property other than the subject matter of the suit. In the present case, it is contended that the subject matter of the previous suit is the self-same property as the present suit and was the subject matter of the compromise exclusively, without any other property being incorporated in the said compromise decree. Thus, the premise of the courts below was erroneous insofar as the previous compromise decree did not require any registration in law.

6. Secondly, it is argued that since the present defendants were parties to the previous litigation as proforma defendants, the said compromise decree arrived at in the previous second appeal is binding on them as well. Thus, the title of the plaintiffs/appellants cannot be disputed now by the defendants.

7. Moreover, it is contended that, in any event, on the strength of the registered deed of gift, the plaintiffs/appellants should have been declared to have title in the suit property.

8. Learned senior counsel for the appellants, however, does not press the claim of adverse possession.

9. Upon hearing learned senior counsel, we find that in any event, the plea of adverse possession would be mutually destructive of the other claims of title and as such, could not have been taken by the plaintiffs/appellants in any event. Giving the benefit of doubt to the plaintiffs/appellants to the extent that the plea of adverse possession might have been claimed in the alternative, we proceed to adjudicate on the other two counts on which title has been claimed by the plaintiffs/appellants.

10. There cannot be a