The principle of res judicata applies to writ petitions under Article 226, preventing relitigation of issues previously adjudicated on merits.

1. These three appeals have been heard together since they involve a common question of law. It would not be necessary for us to detail the facts of each of them; suffice it to say that the three appellants were members of the police force, being Sub-Inspectors who were dismissed from service on charges of misconduct. The charge against each of them is set out in extenso in the paper book of the respective appeals.

2. After the orders of dismissal had been made, an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution for appropriate writs to quash the orders was preferred to this Court. The three appellants joined in one application for the writs and Sinha, J. who dealt with it dismissed it In limine by an order, dated February 23, 1959. In that order the learned Judge dealt with the several questions raised, and held that none of them called for the issue of a Rule requiring the respondents to show cause against the orders of dismissal complained of. From the order made it appears that four points were specifically urged before the learned Judge in support of the application. Each one of these points received separate consideration, and all of them related to the merits of the case affecting each of the appellants.

3. It does not appear clear when thereafter these appellants preferred appeals from the order of Sinha, J., but there are indications in the record suggesting that the decision was challenged in appeal which does not appear to have been prosecuted. What appears clear, however, is that an appeal was preferred in each case to the Deputy Inspector General of Police on December 14, 1959, challenging the order of dismissal made on November 30, 1958. The appeals were lodged after the time limited by R.883 of the Police Regulations, Bengal had expired. That Rule provides for an appeal to be lodged within thirty - seven days of the order appealed from. The Appellate Authority refused to entertain the appeals on the ground that they had been barred by time. A further observation was made that satisfactory explanation had not been offered explaining the delay in lodging the appeals within the time limited by the Rule referred to above. It seems to us that R.883 has, statutory effect which prescribes amongst other things the period of limitation within which appeals have to be brought. This order dismissing the appeals was made on February 4, 1960, by the Deputy Inspector General of Police.

4. On February 24, 1960, the appellants again applied under Art. 226 of the Constitution for appropriate writs to quash the orders of dismissal made on November 30, 1958, as well as the appellate order refusing to entertain the appeals made by the Deputy Inspector General of Police on February, 4, 1960. This application also came to be heard by Sinha, J. who upon a consideration of the questions raised came to the conclusion that it was no longer open to the appellants to reagitate the matter for a second time in an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

5. This time the three appellants made separate applications asking for identical reliefs. They were, however, dealt with by the learned Judge together since they raised a common question which could conveniently be disposed of by one order. The learned Judge set out the preliminary facts and proceeded to consider whether in the circumstances that had happened, it was still open to the appellants to reopen the question of the legality or propriety of the orders of dismissal by means of a second application under Art. 226 of the Constitution. He held that the applicants were "precluded on principles analogous to res judicata" to reagitate identical questions which had been