The Tribunal must evaluate applications for condonation of delay considering S.14 of the Limitation Act, not merely the timing of the appeal.

1. It is not in dispute that the West Bengal Cooperative Tribunal is an Appellate Authority against an award passed by the Arbitrator under the West Bengal Co - operative Societies Act. It is also not in dispute that the Act gives power to the Tribunal to condone the delay, if an appeal challenging the award is filed after the expiration of the statutory period.

2. The source of power to condone the delay is eminent in the statutory provision and, therefore, it is a duty of the Tribunal to consider the said application on the basis of the averments made therein.

3. The award is passed in Dispute Case No. 5 / RCS of 2012 on 16th October, 2012. The petitioner herein challenged the said award in an application under Art.226 of the Constitution of India before this Court, which was registered as AST 173 of 2013.

4. It is sought to be argued before this Court that the Tribunal is not functioning and, therefore, an aggrieved person cannot be rendered remediless. This Court noticed the provisions contained under S.147 of the West Bengal Co - operative Societies Act, 2006, which provides the right to an aggrieved person against an award to prefer an appeal before the Tribunal and permitted the petitioner to file the appeal along with an application for condonation of delay within 7 days from the date of obtaining the certified copy of the order. Admittedly the petitioner filed an appeal along with an application for condonation of delay in terms of such leave granted by this Court in the writ petition.

5. The Tribunal even after recording that the petitioner promptly moved before the Hon'ble High Court with an application under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, but was swayed by the fact that he was aware of his remedy provided by way of an appeal and, therefore, the explanations offered for delay in preferring the same is unacceptable and not sufficient.

6. The Tribunal further construed the expression "sufficient cause" to mean that the person must come within the reasonable time and is depending upon the conduct of the party.

7. The power to condone the delay can be found in different statutes containing the similar expressions and by catena of decisions rendered in this regard, it is a settled proposition of law that the Court should be liberal in dealing with such application and encourage the disposal of the matter on merit.

8. The meaning of the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be brought within the straitjacket formula, as each case has its unique fact and features and depend upon various factors. It is equally settled that the length of delay is immaterial, but the sufficiency of cause is, even the delay of shorter period cannot be condoned in absence of sufficient cause. On the other hand, the delay of longer period can be condoned, if the party was prevented by sufficient cause.

9. In the instant case the Tribunal itself observed that the petitioner promptly moved the High Court with the Writ petition, but refused to condone the delay as the petitioner was oblivion of the fact that his right is provided by way of an appeal. The Tribunal overlooked the provisions contained under S.14 of the Limitation Act , which provides that if a person has proceeded in good faith on an advice in a proceeding, which later on found to be incompetent, the period between which such proceeding was continuing, shall be excluded fo