D/L.19.

September 24, 2025.

MNS.

CO No. 681 of 2024

M/s Mahesk-E-Punjab Retreat Pvt. Ltd.

Vs.

Aryan Dhatu Pvt. Ltd

Mr. Sounak Sengupta,

Mr. Amar Singh,

Mr. Rahul Deb Banerjee,

Ms. Sanchita Bera

… for the petitioner.

Mr. Aniruddha Chatterjee, Sr. Adv.,

Mr. Pankaj Agarwal,

Mr. Parikshit Lakhotia,

Mr. Soham Saha

…for the opposite party.

1. The present revisional application has

been preferred against an order whereby the learned Ttrial Judge dismissed an application for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short “the

1996 Act”).

2. The brief facts are that the Section 34

application was rejected by the concerned court on March 2, 2021. Thereafter, an application for restoration was filed only on

April 3, 2023, along with an application for condonation of delay in filing the same.

3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner seeks to place reliance on the different orders passed by the Supreme Court during the Covid-19 pandemic period, extending the limitation period for filing all applications during the said period.

4. It is submitted that during the said period, the brother of the deponent in the application for condonation of delay met his demise.

5. That apart, the petitioner had relied on the learned Advocate for the petitioner in the court taking up the Section 34 application.

6. Despite being assured by such Advocate that the matter was taken care of, the petitioner was left “aghast” when it was discovered much after that the same was dismissed for default.

7. The learned Trial Judge, while dismissing the said application, disbelieved the grounds taken in the application.

8. It was recorded in the impugned order that the judgment-debtor/petitioner has been deliberately keeping himself abstained from satisfying the particular terms of the award.

9. It was also observed by the learned Trial Judge that in another case, being an execution case pending before the First Court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Barasat, the petitioner had filed a put-up petition on February 10, 2022 and prayed for time to file written objection and on March 25, 2022 filed another petition seeking time to file written objection.

10. It is argued by the petitioner that the petitioner relied on his Advocate and as such it was beyond the control of the petitioner that delay was occasioned in taking out the restoration application.

11. Learned senior counsel appearing for the opposite party takes a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the application since no appeal or application under Article 226/227 of the Constitution lies in respect of a proceeding under the

1996 Act.

12. Learned senior counsel also disputes the contentions of the revisionist petitioner on merits.

13. Insofar as the objection as to maintainability is concerned, the same cannot be accepted.

14. On a conjoint reading of Section 5 of the

1996 Act and Section 37 of the said Act, it is evident that the legislative intent is to curb judicial intervention, unless specifically provided for in the 1996 Act. Section 37 of the 1997 Act is the only appellate provision in the Act. However, it does not provide for an appeal in connection with a rejection of a restoration application or connected application for condonation of delay.

15. However, since there is no specific provision within the four corners of the 1996 Act for restoration of an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act and/or adjudicating on an application for condonation of delay in filing the same, strictly speaking, the impugned order does not come within the legislative regime envisaged under the 1996 Act and the Court taking up an application under Section 34 of the said Act, acts as a civil court within the contemplation of the 1996 Act, having inherent power to consider an application for restoration and/or an application for condonation of delay thereof.

16. Thus, there is no bar in the 1996 Act for judicial interference a