Ct No.10

AD- 18

25.09.2025

(SSS)

CO 1177 of 2024 Smt. Manju Rana

Vs.

Sri Somnath Chandra and Ors.

Mr. Goutam Das

…..for the petitioner.

Mrs. Sabita Mukherjee Roy Chowdhury,

Mr. Sanket Das

….for the opposite parties.

1. The present challenge has been preferred by the defendant in an eviction suit under the West Bengal

Premises Tenancy Act, 1997.

2. By the impugned order, an application filed by the defendant/petitioner under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, for condonation of delay in making the deposit contemplated under Section 7(1) as well as under the first part of Section 7(2) of the

1997 Act, was turned down.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this court in CO 3443 of 2010 with CO 3054 of 2011, where it was held that the time limit fixed, as mentioned in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 7 of the 1997 Act, to pay or to deposit with the Controller or the Civil

Judge all admitted arrears of rent together with interest, as mentioned in Clause (b) thereof and consequently, the time limit mentioned for this purpose as mentioned in sub-section (2), is not inflexible and it can be extended by the court by virtue of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues on the strength of the said judgment as well as Section 40 of the 1997 Act, which provides that the provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to the 1997 Act, that the learned Trial Judge proceeded on an erroneous premise in holding that the mandate of deposit under sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 7 is mandatory and inflexible.

5. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/opposite parties places reliance on a recent judgment in the matter of Seventh Day Adventist Senior Secondary School vs. Ismat Ahmed and Ors., reported at (2025) SCC Online SC 1696, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that where the provisions of Section 7(1), Clauses (a) to (c), as well as the first part of Section 7(2) of the 1997 Act stipulate a mandatory timeline for deposit of amount or filing application, the same cannot be overridden by the provisions of the Limitation Act, unless such deposits are made. It has further been observed in the said report that, where no such deposit is made or application is filed under the statutory time-limit, the defendant cannot take benefit under the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 7 by application of the Limitation Act.

6. It is argued that, as such, the learned Trial Judge was justified in rejecting the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

7. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, it transpires that Section 40 of the 1997 Act does not apply the provisions of the Limitation Act to the 1997 Act in an untrammelled and blanket fashion. The very opening words of Section 40 of the 1997 Act are: “Subject to the provisions of this Act relating to limitation…”. Thus, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to the 1997 Act subject to implicit bars as to limitation as provided in the 1997 Act itself, even as per Section 40 thereof.

8. Seen in such perspective, Section 7(1)(a) is couched in mandatory language by use of the expression “shall” which mandates the tenant, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), to pay to the landlord or deposit with the Civil Judge, all arrears of rent calculated at the rate at which it was last paid and up to the end of the month previous to that in which the payment is paid, together with interest at the rate of 10% per annum.

9. More importantly, Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 7 provides that such payment or deposit “shall” be made within one month of the service of summons on the tenant or, where he appears in the suit without the summons being served upon him, within one month of his appearance.

10. Not only that, Clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the 1997 Act mandates the tenant to continue to pay thereafter to the landlord or deposit with the Civil Judge month by