##PAGE1##

December 31, 2025

ADSL 1

Ct. 8

SG

MAT 2291 of 2025

in

CAN 1 of 2025

Ratan Pal and others

vs.

The Kolkata Municipal Corporation and others

Mr. Sudip Deb, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Sumitava Chakraborty

Mr. Snehasish Dey

… for the appellants/writ petitioners

Mr. Biplab Guha

Mr. Tapas Kumar Das

… for the State

Mr. Vimal Kumar Shahi

Ms. Ina Bhattacheryya

… for the Kolkata Municipal Corporation

Mr. Sounak Mandal

… for the respondent No.10

1. Learned Advocates for the appellants/writ petitioners, the

Kolkata Municipal Corporation authority, the State and

the Respondent No.10 are present. It is submitted by the

learned Advocate for the petitioners that all the

respondents have been served.

2. However, it is submitted by the learned Advocate for the

State Respondents that a copy of the writ petition has not

been served upon him. Let a copy of this application be

served upon the learned Advocate for the State.

3. This appeal is directed against an order dated December

22, 2025 passed in W.P.A. 29519 of 2025 whereby the

2

Hon’ble Single Judge has refused to interfere with the

steps taken by the Respondent Kolkata Municipal

Corporation to demolish the alleged unauthorised four

storeyed structure situated at premises No.132/C, Raja

Rajendralal Mitra Road, Ward No.35, Kolkata-700 010.

4. The Hon’ble Single Judge has refused to interfere with the

demolition proceeding by holding that the provisional

certificate issued by the Thika Controller could not have

authorised the person responsible to carry out illegal

construction without sanction from the Municipal

authority and that although by an order dated March 06,

2017, the Hon’ble Single Judge had directed the Municipal

authority to take steps in terms of Section 400(1) of the

Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, yet, the

petitioners cannot claim any benefit thereunder because

the petitioners are neither responsible for construction nor

have constructed on the said property/land.

5. Learned Advocate for the petitioners submits that the

petitioners are bona fide occupiers of the subject property

which has been directed to be demolished. It is submitted

that the petitioner No.2 is an assignee of a lease by way of

a registered deed of assignment and the other petitioners

are occupying the property upon being issued letters of

possession in respect of flats constructed thereat. It is

submitted that the petitioners came in possession of the

property in the year 2013 and that despite the petitioners

being in possession, no notice of hearing has been issued

to any of them by the Respondent Municipal Authorities.

3

Inviting the attention of this Court to an order dated

March 06, 2017 passed in W.P. 19795(W) of 2015 (Smt.

Kalpana Mullick and others vs. The Kolkata Municipal

Corporation and others), it is submitted that the

Respondent Municipal Corporation was directed to initiate

a proceeding under Section 400(1) of the said Act of 1980,

but from the letter dated December 16, 2025 (at page 59

of the stay petition) it is clear that an order under Section

400(8) of the said Act of 1980 was passed on September

18, 2018 without any reason or rhyme.

6. It is submitted that when the original proceedings were

directed to be initiated under Section 400(1) of the said

Act of 1980, there can be no reason for suddenly

converting the same to a proceeding under Section 400(8)

of the said Act of 1980. In support of his contention that

even occupiers are required to be heard, learned Advocate

for the petitioners has relied on a judgment of the Hon’ble

Apex Court in Gaurav Kohli and others vs. State of

Haryana and others (Civil Appeal No.13045-46 of 2025

decided on 28.10.2025).

7. Learned Advocate for the Corporation submits that in a

proceeding under Section 400(8) of the said Act of 1980,

no hearing is required.

8. Upon our asking as to why an order under Section 400(8)

of the said Act of 1980 was required to be passed, learned

Advocate for the Corporation sought for time to take

appropriate instructions.

4

9. While it is true that the provisions of Section 400(8) of th