12.11.2025 Ct. No.42 Sl. No.6 Mujahid CRR 1495 of 2024 Mrs. Rekha Harsh Vs.

Sanjiv Sharma Mr. Ranjan Kali Ms. Mitul Chakraborty Ms. Payel Nath …for the petitioner Mr. Mayukh Mukherjee Ms. Chumky Agarwal Mr. Akshay Kumar Jain Kukhani …for the respondent

1. Present petition has been filed challenging the order dated 1^st December, 2023 in CS-41362/19 whereby learned Metropolitan Magistrate 19th Court, Calcutta in the proceeding under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, allowed the application under Section 143A(1)(a)filed by the opposite party/complainant and directed the petitioner to make payment of 20% of the total cheque value in favour of the complainant.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the present order is in teeth of the latest judgment of the Supreme Court in Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava vs. The State of Jharkhand & Anr. in Criminal Appeal No.741 of 2024. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order is bereft of any reason and has been passed mechanically. Learned counsel therefore prays that the impugned order may be set aside.

3. Per contra, learned counsel for the opposite party/complainant submits that the petition itself is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and misrepresentation of facts. Learned counsel submits that under Article 131, the revision petition has to be filed within 90 days from the date of the impugned order. Learned counsel submits that the impugned order is of 1st December, 2023 and the petition has been filed on 8th April, 2024. Learned counsel submits that even if the period consumed in getting the certified copy is deducted the petition is barred by limitation. Learned counsel submits that as per the certified coy itself, the application for certified copy was given only on 13^th February, 2024 and the certified copy was delivered on 16th February, 2024. Learned counsel also submits that as per the revision petition, the learned advocate made a representation that the revisional intimation is in time. Learned counsel submits that therefore there is also misrepresentation of facts. In addition to it learned counsel submits that the petitioner has merely given the title of petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., whereas in sum and substance it is a revision petition.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has refuted all the averments and submits that the present petition is under 482 Cr.P.C. and in which there is no limitation.

5. The Apex Court in Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava (supra) while dealing with an issue that what are the factors to be considered while exercising power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A of the NI Act, inter alia, held as under:-

“16. When the court deals with an application under Section 143A of the N.I. Act, the Court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the application under sub- section (1) of Section 143A. The presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act, by itself, is no ground to direct the payment of interim compensation. The reason is that the presumption is rebuttable. The question of applying the presumption will arise at the trial. Only if the complainant makes out a prima facie case, a direction can be issued to pay interim compensation. At this stage, the fact that the accused is in financial distress can also be a consideration. Even if the Court concludes that a case is made out for grant of interim compensation, the Court will have to apply its mind to the quantum of interim compensation to be granted. Even at this stage, the Court will have to consider various factors such as the nature of the transaction, the relationship, if any, between the accused and the complainant and the paying capacity of the accused. If the defence of the accused is found to be prima facie a plausible defence, the Court may exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim compensation. We may note that the factors re