In the High Court at Calcutta Civil Appellate Jurisdiction Appellate Side The Hon’ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya And The Hon’ble Justice Uday Kumar F.M.A. No.555 of 2025 with CAN 1 of 2025 Abdur Rouf Vs.

Lakshmi Asset and Land LLP and Others For the appellant : Mr. Haradhan Banerjee, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Ramdulal Manna, Ms. Manju Manna (Dey), Mr. Sayan Mukherjee For the respondent no.1 : Mr. Surajit Nath Mitra, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Partha Pratim Roy, Mr. Saunak Sengupta, Mr. Soumyadeb Sinha, Ms. Suranjana Chatterjee Heard on : 09.06.2025 & 10.06.2025 Hearing concluded on : 10.06.2025 Judgment on : 16.06.2025 Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-

1. The first defendant in a declaratory suit has preferred the present appeal against an order whereby two successive injunction applications filed by the plaintiffs/respondent no.1, respectively dated October 8, 2024 and February 4, 2025, were disposed of, thereby granting temporary injunction restraining the defendant no.1/appellant from creating any third party interest and from changing the nature and character of the suit property till the disposal of the suit.

2. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the primary reliefs sought in the suit is declaration that a registered deed of conveyance dated March 16, 2012 executed in favour of one MPS Greenery Developers Limited (respondent no.2), the predecessor-in- interest of the defendant no.1/appellant, is a second sale of the scheduled property and therefore a void document and the same is not binding on the plaintiff as well as declaration that a sale certificate dated September 20, 2023 is also consequentially void and not binding upon the plaintiff. Since no relief has been sought for cancellation of the said deeds but the relief has been couched in declaratory form, the suit is governed by Article 58 of the Limitation Act and thus, the starting point of limitation is when the right to sue first accrued. Learned senior counsel for the appellant places reliance on Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, in terms of which a person acquiring a property is deemed to have notice of an instrument from the date of registration of the said instrument. Hence, it is argued that the limitation period for challenging the 2012 deed started from the year 2012 whereas the suit has been filed 12 years thereafter in 2024 and, as such, is palpably time-barred.

3. Learned senior counsel also places reliance on Section 3 of the Limitation Act, which mandates the court to dismiss a suit if barred by limitation, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. Learned senior counsel cites Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) (D) Thr LRs and Ors., reported at (2020) 7 SCC 366, where the Supreme Court considered the difference between Articles 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act and held that in case of the former, the limitation begins from when the right to sue “first” accrues, as opposed to the latter, where the knowledge of the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled is the starting point.

4. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant next cites Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India and another, reported at (2020) 17 SCC 260, where the Supreme Court examined the distinctions between the Articles 58 and 113 of the Limitation Act. It was held that Article 113 stipulates that in case of successive arising of causes of action, the date when the right to sue accrues on any of such instances would be the starting point of limitation, as opposed to Article

58, where the first accrual of the right to sue is the starting point.

5. Learned senior counsel further cites Asma Lateef and Another v.

Shabbir Ahmad and Others, reported at (2024) 4 SCC 696, for the proposition that it is the duty of the court, before granting any interim relief, to record its prima facie satisfaction on the question of maintainability.

6. Learned senior counsel also places reliance on an unreported judgment of a le