OCD-5 & 6 ORDER SHEET IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA Commercial Appellate Division ORIGINAL SIDE APO/130/2023 WITH AP/369/2023 M/S. BINOY TRADING CO. AND ANR.

VS TATA MOTORS FINANCE LIMITED WITH APO/163/2023 M/S. BINOY TRADING CO.

VS TATA MOTORS FINANCE LIMITED BEFORE:

The Hon’ble JUSTICE ARIJIT BANERJEE AND The Hon’ble JUSTICE OM NARAYAN RAI Date : 28th July, 2025.

Appearance:

Mr. Shyamal Chakraborty, Adv. Mr. Jayanta Kumar Dhar, Adv.

..for the appellant Mr. Rohit Banerjee, Adv. Mr. Paritosh Sinha, Adv.

Mr. Saubhik Chowdhury, Adv.

Ms. Tapasika Bose, Adv.

..for the respondent Dictated by Arijit Banerjee, J.

The Court: These two appeals arise out of two arbitration petitions whereby the appellants challenged two arbitral awards passed in favour of the present respondent by a learned sole Arbitrator. The Learned Single Judge dismissed the two applications under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, not on merits but on the ground that the same were not maintainable in the High Court. This is because prior to the setting aside applications being filed, the respondent herein had approached the City Civil Court at Calcutta with post-award Section 9 applications for interim orders to protect the vehicles of the respondent which were in the possession of the present appellants under loan-cum-hypothecation agreements. Such applications under Section 9 were entertained by the Learned City Civil Court and protective orders were also passed. The present appellants approached the Learned City Civil Court with applications for vacating the interim orders passed in favour of the finance company.

In the above factual background, the Learned Single Judge held that in view of Section 42 of the 1996 Act, Learned City Civil Court at Calcutta is clothed with exclusive jurisdiction to entertain all further applications arising out of the concerned arbitration agreements. Accordingly, the Learned Judge dismissed the two arbitration petitions. Being aggrieved, the petitioners before the Learned Single Judge are before us by way of these appeals.

Section 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 reads as follows:-

“42. Jurisdiction. – Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Part or in any other law for the time being in force, where with respect to an arbitration agreement any application under this Part has been made in a Court, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court”.

Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants raised various grievances. He said that firstly, the appointment of Arbitrator was made unilaterally. No consent of the appellants was obtained. No notice of arbitration was served on the appellants. The appellants had no opportunity to contest the claim of the finance company. Therefore, the awards are not sustainable in the eye of law.

All these points the appellants would be entitled to urge before the forum having jurisdiction to entertain their challenge to the concerned arbitral awards. In view of the clear wordings of Section 42 of the 1996 Act, which was incorporated in the statute to avoid conflict between Courts, it is the City Civil Court alone which is competent to entertain the setting aside applications of the appellants herein. Hence, the Learned Judge was perfectly justified in dismissing the applications of the appellants as not being maintainable in this Court.

The contention of the appellants that the City Civil Court does not have pecuniary jurisdiction in the matter is also devoid of merits. The Learned Judge has dealt with this point in the judgment and order impugned before us and we agree with the conclusion of the Learned Judge.

In view of the aforesaid, we find no reason to interfere with the judgment and order sought to be assailed before us. We affirm the impugned judgment and order to the extent it holds that the