In the High Court at Calcutta Civil Appellate Jurisdiction Appellate Side The Hon’ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya And The Hon’ble Justice Uday Kumar F.M.A. No.180 of 2025 with F.M.A. No.181 of 2025 IA No: CAN 1 of 2025 Standard Chartered Bank Limited Vs.

Sanjib Kumar Dey, alias Sanjib Dey and another For the appellant : Mr. Sabyasachi Chowdhury, Sr. Adv., Mr. Soorjya Ganguli, Ms. Pooja Chakraborti, Ms. A. Bhattacharyya, Mr. Aritra Deb For the respondent : Mr. Soumya Majumdar, Sr. Adv., Mr. S. R. Saha Hearing concluded on : 30.01.2025 Judgment on : 06.02.2025 Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-

1. The two appeals are taken up for hearing together, since both arise from connected orders passed in the same suit.

2. The plaintiff/respondent no.1 is an employee of the defendant no.

1/appellant-bank by virtue of an offer of appointment and employment agreement dated January 20, 2015. The defendant no. 2 /respondent no. 2 is a Mumbai branch of the appellant-bank.

3. The genesis of the appeals is a suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent no.

1, inter alia, for a decree of declaration that issuance of a letter dated January 29, 2024 by the defendants to the plaintiffs is illegal, bad in law and without jurisdiction, a declaration that the letter of appointment dated January 20, 2015 executed between the parties is still existing and cannot be cancelled unilaterally without due process of law, for other consequential declarations and for injunction.

4. In connection with the said suit, the plaintiffs/respondents filed an application for temporary injunction restraining the defendants and/or their men, agents and servants from giving effect to the letter issued by the defendants dated January 29, 2024 to the plaintiff/respondent no.1 and to allow him to continue peacefully working as Support Officer and for interim injunction in similar terms.

5. By Order No.02 dated February 26, 2024, an ad interim injunction was granted by the learned Trial Judge, restraining the defendants from giving effect to the letter dated January 29, 2024 till March 28, 2024, which order is the subject-matter of challenge in FMA 180 of 2025.

6. Thereafter the interim order was extended from time to time, lastly vide Order No.10 dated December 9, 2024, whereby the said interim order was extended till the next date, that is, February 5, 2025. The order dated December 9, 2024 is the subject-matter of challenge in FMA 181 of 2025.

7. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant argues that the impugned letter dated January 29, 2024 is not a termination notice but merely an intimation of the potential redundancy situation due to proposed restructuring of the bank and, as such, the defendants ought not to have been restrained from giving effect to the same. It is argued that by virtue of the injunction order, the defendants have been, in effect, restrained from issuing any valid termination notice under Clause 6 of the Employment Contract between the parties.

8. Learned senior counsel next submits that the Employment Contract between the defendants/employers and the plaintiff/respondent no.1 is in the nature of a personal contract and, as such, cannot be specifically enforced under Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1963 Act”). Moreover, the said contractual employment being in itself determinable, no specific performance could be granted in respect of the same. As such, it is argued, no injunction order could be passed in respect of the said contract.

9. Learned senior counsel argues that Clause 6.1 of the Employment Agreement contemplates early termination of the plaintiff’s employment upon the simple issuance of a written notice of three months. The said clause confers such option of early termination to both parties. As such, the contract is determinable by its very nature.

10. It is further contended that any employment contract is a contract of personal nature and, as such, no injunction can be granted in respect of breach ther