10.01.2025 Court No.13 Item Nos.8 to 12 AP FMA 1190 of 2024 Steel Authority of India Limited Vs.

Sri Shiba Pada Banerjee and Ors.

With FMA 1191 of 2024 Steel Authority of India Limited Vs.

Md. Khalid and Ors.

With FMA 1192 of 2024 Steel Authority of India Limited Vs.

Sri Kanan Das and Ors.

With FMA 1193 of 2024 Steel Authority of India Limited Vs.

Sri Asok Kumar Bandopadhyay and Ors.

With FMA 1214 of 2024 Steel Authority of India Limited Vs.

Md. Mohiuddin and Ors.

Mr. Saptangsu Basu, Senior Advocate Mr. Lakshmi Kanta Pal Mr. Bandhu Brata Bhula …. For the Appellant in all the appeals.

Ms. Susmita Saha Dutta Mr. Niladri Saha …. For the Respondent Nos.2, 3 & 4 in FMA 1190 of 2024.

Mr. Swapan Kumar Nandi Mr. Rajesh Kumar Saha …. For the Respondent Nos.2, 3 & 4 in FMA 1191 of 2024. Mr. Siddhartha Lahiri Mr. Tapan Bhanja …. For the Respondent No.4 in FMA 1192 of 2024.

Mr. Indrajeet Dasgupta Ms. Rajesh Kumar Shah …. For the Respondent Nos.2, 3 & 4 in FMA 1193 of 2024.

Ms. Chandri Alam Mr. Amal Kumar Datta …. For the Union of India in FMA 1214 of 2024.

1. These appeals are directed against a judgement and order dated 21^st June, 2024 passed by a Single Bench of this Court. By the said impugned judgement, the Single Bench refused to interfere with the order of the “Controlling Authority” under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 as confirmed by the order of the “Appellate Authority”.

2. Learned Single Bench was of the view that Factual findings of the Controlling and the Appellate Authorities do not call for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Single Bench further found that the reasoning applied by the controlling authority and the appellate authority was sound and correct in law.

3. This Court has very carefully heard Mr. Saptangsu Basu, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant/Steel Authority of India Limited (hereinafter referred to “the SAIL”) and has also carefully considered the pleadings filed before the two authorities under the Act of 1972 and the respective orders. This Court, however, finds that the moot question has not been addressed by the two authorities and the Single Bench, in granting relief to the respondents/workmen.

4. The brief facts relevant to the case are that the Indian Iron and Steel Company (hereinafter referred to “the IISCO”), a Government company, now merged with the SAIL floated a VRS scheme for its employees. In terms of the said scheme, the applicants fulfilling the conditions thereof and applying thereunder were allowed a special lump sum payment in addition to all their dues including gratuity, subject to they are being entitled to the same. The appellant paid gratuity to all applicants for VRS including the applicants before the controlling authority.

5. The dispute in question before the two quasi judicial statutory authorities was whether the admitted period spent by the workman concerned as apprentices under the IISCO, was to be construed as part of the service period, for the purpose of computation of gratuity under the Act of 1972.

6. Admittedly, a large number of apprentices were engaged by the erstwhile IISCO. They were required to undergo a mandatory period of three in such capacity. The said period of three years could be extended in the event of shortfall due to illness or competency issues.

7. In FMA 1191 of 2024 the respondent employee/Md. Khalid spent a period of about 3 years 15 days of apprenticeship. He claimed gratuity for the said period of 3 years and 15 days, which was denied to him. This was the issue before the two Statutory Authorities below and the learned Single Bench i.e. as to whether the period spent under apprenticeship could be included in the length of service for the purpose of computation of gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

8. Before the controlling authority, the appellant could not produce any documents to indicate the date of initial appointment of the respondent/workman as apprentice.

9. The controlling authority relied u