CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL CURT.AT.NAoC. K2 6B0E/N00C0H1, 5C oUfT 2T0A2C4K (Arising out of OA 260/00780/2017 disposed of on 27.06.2024)

OCORRDAERM D: ATED: 05.08.2024 THE HON’BLE SHRI SUDHI RANJAN MISHRA, MEMBER (J)

THE HON’BLE SHRI PRAMOD KUMAR DAS, MEMBER (A)

Pramod Kumar Nanda …Review Applicant VERSUS Union of India & Ors. …Review Respondents For the applicant : Mr. T.K.Mishra, Counsel For the respondents: None O R D E R PRAMOD KUMAR DAS , MEMBER (Admn.):

This RA has been filed by the applicant on 29.07.2024 under Section 22 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, seeking to review the order dated 27.06.2024 in OA 780/2017, copy of which was made ready for delivery on 03.07.2024. In terms of the Rule 17 (3) of Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987 and the Notification dated 18th February, 1992 issued by Hon’ble Chairman in exercise of power conferred under Section 5, 12 and 22 of the A.T. Act, 1985, this RA has been placed for consideration on circulation by the Registry.

2. Perused the averments and grounds raised by the applicant in the RA vis a vis the records of the OA and the final order dated 27.06.2024. The applicant has sought to review the order on the grounds a s under:

(a) Applicant since 1995 kept ventilating his grievance for grant of TBOP/BCR/MACP on 12.01.1995 and 16.10.2005 respectively but authorities did not dispose of the same and kept the matter pending.

(b) Tribunal without considering the law decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Raghunathpur Nafer Academy Vs. LIC of India (sic.)/Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Ra ghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others, (2013) 12 SCC 649, dismissed the OA on the ground of delay and laches.

(c) Since the right of the applicant has been discriminated when similarly situated persons have received the benefits of TBOP/BCR/MACP, hence, the OA should be heard on merit.

(d) When similar group of employees have recieved the benefits dismissal of OA on the ground of limitation is illegal.

2. Insofar as grounds stated and reflected at (a) (c) and (d) are concerned, the said facts have been taken note of by this Tribunal as is evident from the final order.

3. Insofar as the grounds stated in para (b) that this Tribunal dismissed the OA without taking into consideration the decision in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others, is concerned, it may be recorded that this ground is hardly of any merit for exercising the power of review by this Tribunal and suffice it to place the Arreilbiaanmce Toufl etshhew daerc iSsihoanr mofa thVes AHroinb’abmle PAipshexa kC Sohuarrt mina athned Ocarsse of ., (1979) 4 SCC 389, an excerpt from it is quoted herein below:

“We are afraid that neither of the reasons mentioned by the learned Judicial Commissioner constitute a ground for review. It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdev Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. AIR 1963 SC 1909 there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitutence preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which iuheram in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and pulpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due digilence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all manner of errors committed by the Subordinate Court.”(em