Rejection of candidature based solely on an FIR after acquittal is arbitrary; suitability must be contextually assessed.

ORDER

Hon’ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J)

In the present O.A. filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act , 1985, the applicant has prayed for the following reliefs:-

“A. Call for records of the case;

B. Quash and set aside the impugned order dated 06/12/2024,

C. Direct the Respondents to appoint the Applicant in the post of Constable (Driver) under SC category with all consequential benefits including arrears of pay, seniority, increment etc;

D. Award cost of the proceedings: and

E. Pass any order/relief/direction(s) as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice in favour of the Applicant.”

2. Highlighting the facts of the case, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant, a meritorious candidate, duly qualified in all stages of the selection process, including the Computer Based Examination, PET/PST/Trade Test and medical examination, and had truthfully disclosed in the attestation form the registration of FIR No. 411/2019 dated 13.12.2019 at PS: Thoi, Distt: Sikar, Rajasthan, in which he was falsely implicated and thereafter acquitted.

2.1. It was contended that the applicant has no criminal antecedents and has neither suppressed nor concealed any material fact, and that rejection of his candidature solely on the basis of the said FIR is contrary to the fundamental principle of presumption of innocence and settled law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Joginder Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh (MANU/SC/1042/2014) and Deputy Inspector General of Police v. S. Samuthiram (MANU/SC/1029/2012, wherein it has been held that denial of public employment after acquittal is arbitrary and unsustainable as also the principle reiterated by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Mahendra Solanki v. The Commissioner of Police (W.P. (C) No. 2219/2023 that there should be no mechanical invocation of moral turpitude to deny appointment and that suitability must be assessed on the basis of the facts of each case.

2.2. Reliance was further placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Mahesh Kumar v. Union of India & Ors. (2023 SCC OnLine Del 2113) and Prashant Deep v. High Court of Delhi (W.P. (C) No. 1960/2019), holding that mere registration of an FIR or past criminal proceedings, especially where the candidate stands acquitted, cannot be a ground to deny appointment without examining the nature of allegations, conduct and moral turpitude.

2.3. Learned counsel further submitted that the impugned order has been passed mechanically, without application of mind, in violation of the respondents’ own Standing Order No. 12/2022 and the doctrine of legitimate expectation as explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dinesh Kumar Kashyap & Ors. v. South East Central Railways & Ors. (CA No. 11363/2018), thereby inflicting a punishment upon the applicant, which is illegal, arbitrary, violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and liable to be set aside.

3. Opposing the grant of relief, learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed the Original Application submitting that the applicant’s candidature was examined strictly in accordance with Standing Order No. HRD/12/2022, after issuance of a show cause notice and due consideration of his reply and record by the duly constituted Screening Committee, which, on an objective assessment of antecedents, found the applicant unsuitable for appointment as Constable (Driver), Delhi Police.

3.1. Learned counsel contended that mere acquittal does not automatically entitle a provisionally selected candidate to appointment, particularly where the acquittal is based on benefit of doubt or compromise, as held by the H