CUSTOMS, EXCISE AND SERVICE TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL CHENNAI REGIONAL BENCH – COURT NO. III Excise Appeal No.42638 of 2017 (Arising out of Order-in-Appeal No.36/2017 SLM-CEX dated 05.09.2017 passed by Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals-I Coimbatore), Circuit Office @ Salem Commissionerate)

M/s. Sakthi Sugars Ltd., ....Appellant Sakthi Nagar, Appakudal, Bhavani TaluK, Erode-638 315.

Versus Commissioner of GST & Central Excise, … Respondent Salem Commissionerate, No. 1, Foulkes Compound, Anaimedu, Salem – 636 001. APPEARANCE:

Ms. Mathanghi G., Advocate for the Appellant Ms. G. Krupa, Authorized Representative for the Respondent CORAM:

HON’BLE MR. P. DINESHA, MEMBER (JUDICIAL)

HON’BLE MR. VASA SESHAGIRI RAO, MEMBER (TECHNICAL)

FINAL ORDER No.40026/2026 DATE OF HEARING: 26.11.2025 DATE OF DECISION: 08.01.2026 Per: Shri P. Dinesha This Appeal is filed against the impugned Order-in-

Appeal No. 36/2017 dated 05.09.2017 challenging the direction of the Commissioner to the very limited extent. Admitted and undisputed facts are that the Appellant did not dispute the classification of the goods in question, but however, raised an objection with regard to the invocation of extended period of limitation in the Show Cause Notice whereby, inter alia, penalty was also imposed. The scope of the Appeal, therefore lies on a very narrow compass; that whether the duty demand, interest and penalty beyond the normal period is justified?

2. We have heard Ms. Mathanghi, Ld. Advocate for the Appellant-Assessee and Ms. G. Krupa, Ld. Superintendent for the Respondent-Revenue.

3. We have carefully perused the impugned order and the documents placed before us. We have also gone through the written submission/synopsis filed before us during the course of hearing; it is clear from the above that Appellant has admitted the issue in so far as the same relates to the classification, but however, it was argued by the Advocate that the period of dispute is April 2011 to February 2016, for which SCN was issued on 29.04.2016, as it stood during the period under dispute prescribed one year as the normal period under Section 11A(9) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. She would thus submit that the Amendment which was introduced by Section 143 of the Finance Act, 2016 with effect only from 14.05.2016 by substituting the period of ‘one year’ by ‘two years’ as the normal period which has been wrongly applied by the authorities below, which is the reason for the First Appellate Authority to restrict the duty liability, interest and penalty for the normal period i.e. two years, which was not in the Statute. Though the First Appellate Authority has felt it proper to delete the demand for the period for which the extended period of limitation was invoked, however, the demand should have been restricted to 1 year.

4. Per contra ld. Superintendent Ms. G. Krupa, supported findings of the Lower Authorities, but however, she was fair enough to admit that the Department has not come in Appeal against that part of the order whereby the Adjudicating Authority has set aside demand interest and penalty for the period for which the same was raised by invoking the extended period of limitation.

5. Having heard both sides and perused the relevant Section, i.e. Section 11A(9), it is very clear that the normal period of two years has been inserted to be effective only from 14.05.2006 and, therefore, the argument of Ld. Advocate is factually correct. Hence, we are of the view that the Commissioner’s direction restricting the demand of duty, interest, and penalty for the normal period of two years is found faulty and the same is modified as applicable for one year. In the result, Appeal stands allowed and the direction of the First Appellate Authority vide impugned order dated 05.09.2017 stands modified, restricting the demand of duty, interest and penalty as applicable to the normal period of one year. Appeal is disposed of on above terms.

(Order pronounced in open court on 08.01.2026)

sd/- sd/-

(VASA