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2026 Supreme(Online)(CESTAT) 2882
CUSTOMS, EXCISE AND SERVICE TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL MUMBAI REGIONAL BENCH
S.K. Mohanty, Judicial Member, M.M. Parthiban, Technical Member
EMIL PHARMACEUTICALS INDUSTRIES P LTD – Appellant
Versus
COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE-THANE-II – Respondent
Excise Appeal No: 86312 of 2017
For the Appellants/Petitioners: SS Gupta
For the Respondents: Rajiv Ranjan
The classification of a product must be consistent; if the Tribunal has previously set aside demands for the same product for other periods, a demand for the remaining period on the same grounds is unsustainable.
Headnote:(A) Classification of Goods - Animal feed supplement - Consistency in Adjudication - Where the Tribunal has already set aside classification orders for the same product for other periods, the demand for the remaining period on identical grounds cannot be sustained. (Para 5, 6)
Issues: Whether the classification of 'animal feed supplement' under Chapter heading 3003/3004 is sustainable given previous Tribunal rulings in favor of the appellant for other periods.
| Table of Content |
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| 1. background of recurring classification dispute for animal feed supplement and previous favorable rulings. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4) |
| 2. demand is unsustainable when previous orders on the same issue have been set aside by the tribunal. (Para 5) |
| 3. final setting aside of the demand and allowing of the appeal. (Para 6) |
PER: S.K. MOHANTY
Heard both sides and perused the case records.
2. Classification of ‘animal feed supplement’ is the subject matter of present dispute. The appellant had claimed classification of the said goods under Chapter heading 2309 of the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. However, the Department had changed the classification of the said excisable goods to Chapter heading 3003/3004.
3. The classification dispute involved in the present appeal is recurring in nature. For the period March, 2008 to November, 2012, against the adjudication order dated 26.07.2013 passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise, Thane-II, the Tribunal vide Final Order No.87452/2024 dated 12.12.2024 had set aside the said order and allowed the appeal in favour of the appellant. The period of dispute involved in the present appeal are from December, 2012 to June, 2013; July, 2013 to March, 2014 and April, 2014 to September, 2014. The adjudication orders for the said period passed by the lower authorities were appealed against before the learned Commissioner (Appeals). By a common Order- in-Appeal No. SK/73-75/TH-II/2017 dated 02.03.2017 (impugned herein), the learned Commissioner (Appeals) has disposed of the appeals, in confirming the adjudged demands. In the said order, it was held that the earlier order dated 26.07.2013 passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise, Thane-II had not yet been set aside at the appellate stage.
4. We find that the present impugned order passed for the period July, 2013 to September, 2014 was the subject matter of dispute before the Tribunal in respect of the Appeal Nos. E/86298 of 2018 and E/86321 of 2017. The Tribunal vide the Final Order No. A/87010-87011/2025 dated 10.12.2025 has set aside the Order-in-Appeal dated 02.03.2017 and allowed the appeals in favour of the appellants. The left-over period as per the impugned order for a decision, is in context with the confirmed demand from December 2012 to June, 2013.
5. The learned Commissioner (Appeals) in the impugned order at paragraph 5 has held that no decision has been taken by the Tribunal in response to the Order dated 26.07.2013, and as such, he could not take a contrary view than the view expressed by the Commissioner of Central Excise, Thane-II. However, we are of the view that such stand is not sustainable, inasmuch as the said dated 26.07.2013 was set aside by the Tribunal vide dated 12.12.2024 (supra). Further, the present impugned order dated 02.03.2017 was also set aside by this Bench of the Tribunal in the Order dated 10.12.2025 (supra). Therefore, we are of the view that the self-same order dated 02.03.2017 (impugned herein), passed for the period December 2012 to June, 2013, cannot also be sustained.
6. In view of the above, the demand confirmed against the appellant for the period December 2012 to June, 2013 is set aside and the appeal is allowed in favour of the appellant.
