Order on Board

17.9.2024

1. Petitioner has filed this writ petition seeking following reliefs:-

“i. That the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue appropriate writ and set aside the order dated 28.03.2024 passed by learned Tahsildar, Rajnandgaon in revenue case no.202404090800029/B-121/2023-2024 (Annexure P-1) in the interest of justice.

ii. To kindly make any other order or writ that may be deemed fit and just in the facts and circumstances of the case including awarding of the costs to the petitioner.”

2. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that the Tahsildar without hearing the petitioner and without granting opportunity to file reply to application for stay submitted by respondent No.5, has granted stay on construction work on the land in question, which is unknown to law. He submits that it is well settled that revenue Courts do not have power to grant injunction, it can be granted only by civil court and by none else. He places reliance on the order dated 16.9.2021 passed by Coordinate Bench of this Court in WPC No.235/2020 (Smt. Vandana Gupta vs. State of CG & ors).

3. Learned counsel representing respondent No.5 submits that he does not dispute legal submission made by learned counsel for petitioners with respect to jurisdiction of the Tahsildar to pass an order impugned granting injunction. He further submits that respondent No.5 has already approached competent civil Court by filing a civil suit for declaration and injunction, which is registered as Civil Suit No.15A/2024 and the same is pending consideration.

4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents filed along with writ petition including order impugned.

5. The issue relating to jurisdiction of the Tahsildar to grant stay/ injunction in revenue proceeding has come up for consideration before this Court in the matter of Seraj Ahmed vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others, reported in 2017 (4) CGLJ 559, and relying on the decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Maya Lalchandani (Mrs.) vs. Board of Revenue, 2009 (3) MPLJ 660, it was observed thus:-

“3. Order to grant injunction is surely vested in the jurisdictional civil court, revenue courts cannot grant order of injunction. Therefore, the order passed by the revenue authority granting temporary injunction restraining transfer following the principle of law laid down in Maya Lalchandani (supra) is without jurisdiction and without authority of law. It is accordingly set aside. However, the Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) is directed to take decision on merits after hearing the parties in accordance with law, expeditiously, within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.”

6. In case of Maya Lalchandani (supra), it was observed thus:-

"4. After going through the order passed by the learned President, Board of Revenue and taking into consideration the legal provisions, we are of the opinion that the directions issued in paragraph 7 of the order passed by the Board of Revenue cannot be allowed to stand. Section 32 of the Land Revenue Code talks of the inherent powers of the Revenue Authorities while Section 43 talks of applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is to be seen from Section 32 that nothing in the Land Revenue Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Revenue Court to make such orders as may be necessary to meet the ends of justice or as may be necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of Court. Section 43 simply provides that unless otherwise expressly provided in the Code, the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure shall, so far as may be, followed in all proceedings under the Code. Section 43 in no case would authorize a Revenue Authority to grant an injunction. Section 43 simply provides that the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure so far as may be followed in all proceedings under the Code. It is also to be seen from the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure that an injunction can be