Order on Board

03/02/2025

1. By the present writ petition, the petitioner is questioning the order dated 01/08/2024 (Annexure P/1) passed by the Tahsilder, Belgahna whereby the Tahsildar affirmed his own order dated 15/05/2023 whereby he had directed the petitioner to stop construction over the land in question.

2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the impugned order dated 01/08/2024 as well as the order dated 15/05/2023 are restraining the petitioner to construct over the land owned by the petitioner. He further submits that the orders passed by the Tahsildar are in the nature of temporary injunction that cannot be passed by the Tahsildar by exercising jurisdiction under the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (CGLRC). He further contended that the temporary injunction order of the like nature cannot be passed in exercise of jurisdiction by the Court of Tahsildar. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the matter of Smt. Vandana Gupta vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. in WPC No.235/2020 and submits that the order passed by the Tahsildar is without jurisdiction and the same cannot be sustainable in the eyes of law.

3. Learned counsel appearing for the State submits that the order impugned is an appealable order hence the present writ petition itself is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleading made by the petitioner.

5. Reading the order passed by the Tahsildar would show that nature of the direction issued by the Tahsildar is in the form of injunction order whereby the entire construction which was to be made on the landed property was stayed.

6. This Court in Seraj Ahmad Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & others

2017 (4) C.G.L.J. 559 has held that the order to grant injunction is surely vested in the jurisdictional Civil Court and the Revenue Courts cannot grant the order of injunction and it was held that the revenue order granting temporary injunction restraining the transfer would be without jurisdiction and without authority of law. The said judgment was based on a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court rendered in Maya Lalchandani (Mrs.) Vs. Board of Revenue 2009 (3) MPLJ 660. I am also in respectful agreement with the judgment passed by this Court in Seraj Ahmad Vs. State of C.G. (Supra) on earlier occasion and the relevant part of the decision is reproduced herein below:

2. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) has passed order on 10.03.2016 granting temporary injunction for which he has no jurisdiction, therefore, the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) is without jurisdiction and without authority of law. He relies upon a decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Maya Lalchandani (Mrs.) and others Vs. Board of Revenue and others in which the M.P. High Court has held as under:

"4. After going through the order passed by the learned President, Board of Revenue and taking into consideration the legal provisions, we are of the opinion that the directions issued in paragraph 7 of the order passed by the Board of Revenue cannot be allowed to stand, Section 32 of the Land Revenue Code talks of the inherent powers of the Revenue Authorities while Section 43 talks of applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is to be seen from Section 32 that nothing in the Land Revenue Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Revenue Court to make such orders as may be necessary to meet the ends of justice or as may be necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of Court Section 43 simply provides that unless otherwise expressly provided in the Code, the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure shall, so far as may be, followed in all proceedings under the Code, Section 43 in no case would authorise a Revenue Authority to gran