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2021 Supreme(Online)(Chh) 2635

CHHATTISGARH HIGH COURT
*Manindra Mohan Shrivastava, Vimla Singh Kapoor, JJ.
Union of India v. Todarmull Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd. (Engineers and Contractors)
Arbitration No. Not specified



The limitation for setting aside an arbitral award begins from the date of receipt of the award, not from the rejection of an application under S.33.

Headnote:The judgment addresses an appeal against the dismissal order of the appellant's application under S.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The court analyzed the timeline for applying under S.34 following a time-barred application under S.33, ultimately dismissing the appeal as it was filed past the limitation period. The issue encompassed whether the limitation for setting aside the award began with the award's receipt or the rejection of a prior application. The court ruled the three-month period begins from receipt of the arbitral award itself and not from the application dismissal date. The final verdict of the court stated there was no merit in the appeal, leading to its dismissal.

Table of Content
1. the appeal is against a dismissal order regarding limitation. (Para 1 , 2)
2. discussion of the contractual agreement and arbitration initiation. (Para 3 , 4)
3. arguments concerning the timeliness of the application for setting aside the award. (Para 5 , 6 , 7)
4. the court's interpretation of s.34 and s.33 limitation provisions. (Para 9 , 10)
5. final ruling on the appeal's merit. (Para 12 , 13 , 15)

1. This appeal is directed against the order dated 09.09.2019 passed by the Commercial Court, Raipur by which, the appellant's application under S.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short "the Act of 1996") for setting aside the award has been dismissed as barred by limitation Act.

2. The factual matrix, relevant for decision of the controversy in this case are in narrow encompass stated as infra.

3. The appellant herein invited bid for certain works of extension. In response thereto, the respondent submitted his bid and the same was accepted leading to an agreement between the parties which was signed on 24.02.2014. Later on, dispute and differences having arisen between the parties, agreement was terminated on 09.09.2015 by the appellant. The respondent - contractor invoked arbitration clause. The sole arbitrator adjudicated the dispute and passed an award for a sum of Rs. 1,16,23,825/- along with interest @ 10% per annum in favour of the contractor. The sole arbitrator also directed the appellant to bear its own cost and also to pay Rs. 4,00,000/- towards cost to the respondent - contractor. Counter claim of the appellant was also dismissed.

4. After receipt of the copy of award, the appellant moved an application under S.33 of the Act before the sole arbitrator seeking correction of award dated 13.12.2018. However, the sole arbitrator rejected the said application holding that the application was barred by limitation. Thereafter, the appellant challenged the award by moving an application under S.34 of the Act before the Commercial Court.

5. The respondent raised a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of application under S.34 of the Act on the ground that the application was filed beyond the period of limitation, as provided under S.34(3) of the Act. According to the respondent, the period of limitation was required to be counted from the date of receipt of Arbitral award and not from the date on which application under S.33 of the Act was rejected. The contention of the respondent before the Commercial 3 Court was that as the application under S.33 of the Act was not disposed off on merit but dismissed as barred by limitation, the limitation would not begin to run from the date of disposal of request but from the date of receipt of arbitral award. This contention of respondent found favour and the application was dismissed as barred by limitation, giving rise to this appeal.

6. Learned counsel for the appellant would argue that the provisions of S.34(3) of the Act are plain and unambiguous that if a request has been made under S.33 of the Act, limitation for filing application under S.34 of the Act would begin to run from the date on which that request is disposed off by Arbitral Tribunal irrespective of whether it has been disposed of on merit or has been dismissed as barred by limitation. His submission is that the sole Arbitrator committed illegality in rejecting the application under S.33 of the Act as barred by limitation. It is his contention that in view of provision contained in S.43 of the Act, the Arbitrator had power to condone the delay beyond 30 days as provided under S.33 of the Act and therefore, the Arbitrator ought to have condoned the delay and decided the application on its own merit. His further contention is that the rejection of application under S.33 of the Act, in all circumstances, will give him fresh cause of action to challenge the award and therefore, under any circumstance, the period of limitation would begin to run only from the date of rejecti















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