1. Petitioner removed from Panchayat service without departmental enquiry, violating Rule 7 of Chhattisgarh Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999. (Para 2 , 3 )
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J
Rakesh Dewangan – Appellant
Versus
State Govt. of Chhattisgarh – Respondent
WPS No. 5731 of 2023
Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Vinod Kumar Sharma
For the Respondents: Sangharsh Pandey, Aniruddha Shrivastava
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Vinod Kumar Sharma
For the Respondents: Sangharsh Pandey, Aniruddha Shrivastava
In service matters involving serious civil consequences, such as termination, courts and quasi-judicial authorities should adopt a liberal and pragmatic approach toward condoning delay if the party was bona fide pursuing other legal remedies, ensuring substantive justice prevails over technicalities.
Headnote:(A) Chhattisgarh Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 - Rule 7 - Limitation Act - Section 5 - Constitution of India - Article 14 - Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 - Removal from service of Shiksha Karmi - Condonation of delay in filing revision - Revisional authority dismissed the revision on the ground of limitation without examining the merits of the case - Time spent in bona fide prosecution of a writ petition before the High Court constitutes sufficient cause for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act - In service matters involving serious civil consequences, procedural lapses in drafting the application for condonation of delay should not defeat substantive justice - The power to condone delay should be exercised in a liberal and justice-oriented manner. (Paras 19, 20, 21)
Facts of the case:
A Shiksha Karmi was removed from service on 15.01.2016 without a departmental enquiry, allegedly violating Rule 7 of the Rules of 1999. After the Collector dismissed his appeal, the petitioner filed a writ petition before the High Court, which was subsequently withdrawn with liberty to seek the statutory remedy of revision. The revision filed before the Commissioner, Durg Division, was dismissed on 14.03.2023 solely on the grounds of limitation, describing the delay as inordinate, despite the petitioner having pursued the legal remedy before the Court.
Findings of Court:
The petitioner's pursuit of the remedy before the High Court was bona fide, and the time consumed therein constitutes "sufficient cause" for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Given that the removal order entails serious civil consequences affecting livelihood and career, the revisional authority's hyper-technical approach in rejecting the revision on the grounds of limitation was improper.
Issues: Whether the delay in filing the revision should be condoned in light of the petitioner's previous bona fide pursuit of a remedy via a writ petition and whether the serious nature of the removal order justifies a liberal approach to the limitation period.
Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that the period spent diligently prosecuting a remedy before the High Court constitutes "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Procedural defects in drafting should not hinder substantive justice in service matters where the consequences of dismissal or removal are drastic.
Result: Writ petition disposed of; delay condoned and matter remitted to the Commissioner, Durg Division, for fresh decision on merits.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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administrative law
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service law
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termination of service
- disciplinary proceedings
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termination of service
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service law
- practice and procedure
- constitutional law
Table of Contents
2. Petitioner argues termination void for violating natural justice and Rule 7; respondents assert delay, laches, and that inquiry was held. (Para 6 , 7 , 12 , 15 )
3. Termination has serious civil consequences; time spent pursuing writ petition constitutes sufficient cause for delay. (Para 18 , 19 , 20 )
4. Delay in filing revision may be condoned where explanation shows bonafide conduct, especially in service termination cases. (Para 20 , 21 )
5. Delay condoned; impugned order set aside; Commissioner directed to decide revision afresh on merits. (Para 22 , 23 )
6. What constitutes sufficient cause for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in service matters?
Time spent bonafidely pursuing a prior writ petition constitutes sufficient cause, and procedural lapses should not defeat substantial justice. (Para 19 , 20 )
7. Should a revisional authority reject a revision solely on limitation without considering merits when termination has serious civil consequences?
No, the authority should adopt a liberal and justice-oriented approach, especially when refusal would result in miscarriage of justice. (Para 18 , 21 )
8. Can technical deficiencies in drafting a condonation application be overlooked in service termination cases?
Yes, technical deficiencies ought not to defeat substantive justice, particularly in service matters where consequences are drastic. (Para 20 )
Order on Board
04.02.2026
1. By filing the instant writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for
following relief(s) :-
“10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased to order quashing of impugned order
dated 14-03-2023 of learned Commissioner
Durg Division Durg and to cancel order dated
15-01-2016 of CEO Sahaspur Lohara and
order dated 21-07-2016 of Collector and
respondents may kindly be ordered to reinstate
the petitioner with all consequential benefits.
10.2 That cost of litigation and any other relief
which the Hon'ble Court deems fit may kindly
also be awarded.”
2. Brief facts of the case, in a nutshell are that the petitioner was
appointed to the post of Shiksha Karmi by order dated 29.07.2006
issued by the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Panchayat, Kabirdham,
and since the date of appointment, the petitioner continuously
discharged his duties sincerely and to the satisfaction of the
authorities concerned. No adverse entry or misconduct was ever
communicated to the petitioner during his long tenure of service.
While the petitioner was in service, he was abruptly and arbitrarily
removed from employment with effect from 15.01.2016 by order
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passed by the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat,
Sahaspur Lohara. The said removal order was passed without
initiating any departmental enquiry and in complete violation of
Rule 7 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Service (Discipline and
Appeal) Rules, 1999 (for short, ‘Rules of 1999’), which mandates
issuance of a charge-sheet, holding of a regular enquiry, and
granting reasonable opportunity of hearing to the delinquent
employee.
3. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the arbitrary termination,
preferred an appeal before the Collector, Kabirdham. However, the
said appeal was dismissed by order dated 21.07.2016 in a
mechanical and arbitrary manner, without considering the
fundamental illegality committed by the Chief Executive Officer in
violating Rule 7 of the Rules of 1999.
4. Thereafter, the petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P.(S)
No. 5183 of 2016, which came to be disposed of by order dated
26.09.2016, granting liberty to the petitioner to file an
appeal/revision before the competent authority.
5. Subsequently, the petitioner preferred a revision before the
Commissioner, Durg Division Durg. However, the learned
Commissioner, by order dated 14.03.2023, dismissed the revision
solely on the ground of limitation, without examining the merits of
the case or the grave illegality and contempt involved in the
termination order. Hence, the present petition.
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6. Mr. Vinod Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that the impugned action of the respondents is ex facie
illegal, arbitrary and contemptuous of the binding judgments
passed by this Court as well as the settled law laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is submitted that the petitioner was
removed from service without following the mandatory procedure
prescribed under Rule 7 of the Rules of 1999, thereby violating the
principles of natural justice and rendering the termination order
void ab initio. It is vehemently contended that the impugned action
is squarely covered by the judgment passed by this Court in WPS
No. 984 of 2013 (Rohini Jha and another v. State of
Chhattisgarh) decided on 20.04.2018, wherein this Court has
categorically held that any termination from Panchayat service
without strict adherence to Rule 7 of the Rules of 1999 is illegal
and unsustainable in law. Despite the existence of a clear and
binding precedent, the respondents have deliberately ignored the
said judgment and have proceeded to pass and sustain orders
which are not only illegal but also contemptuous in nature.
7. Mr. Sharma further submits that, in addition to the violation of
statutory rules, the impugned action is also hit by the law laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Krishna
Pandey, AIR 1966 SC 1656, wherein it has been held that
departmental proceedings cannot ordinarily be initiated after an
unreasonable and unexplained delay of several years, a
