2026:CGHC:7538 Digitally signed by SIDDHANT SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR TAMRAKAR Date:

2 1 0 7 2 :0 6 8 .0 :0 2 6 .11 NAFR +0530 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MAC No. 1542 of 2025

1. Principal, Government Industrial Training Institute, Kurud, District -

Dhamtari (C.G.)

2. State Of Chhattisgarh Through District Collector, Bastar, District -

Jagdalpur (C.G.)

... Appellant(s)

versus

1. Smt. Laxmi Tiwari W/o Late Abhishek Thakur Aged About 31 Years R/o Village Pandav Nagar, Shahdol District - Shahdol (Mp)

2. Aarush Thakur S/o Late Abhishek Thakur Aged About 7 Years (Minor)

Through Natural Guardian Smt. Laxmi Tiwari (Mother ) R/o Village Pandav Nagar, Shahdol District - Shahdol (Mp) As Per Hon'ble Court Order Dated

21-07-2025

3. Smt. Nisha Thakur W/o Rajkishor Thakur Aged About 65 Years R/o Village Pandav Nagar, Shahdol District - Shahdol (Mp)

4. Rajkishor Thakur S/o Late Swarup Lal Thakur Aged About 70 Years R/o Village Pandav Nagar, Shahdol District - Shahdol (Mp)

... Respondent(s)

For State/Appellants : Mr. Anil S. Pandey, Government Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey

Order on Board

11.02 .2026

1. Heard on I.A. No. 02/2025, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay occurred in filing of the MAC.

2. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that award was passed on

31.10.2023, thereafter documents were forwarded to the Law and Legislative Affairs Department, Government of Chhattisgarh on 29.05.2025. He would submit that approval was granted by the department, and thereafter, appeal was preferred. He would submit that the appellants have explained delay part properly.

3. I have heard Mr. Pandey at length and perused the application for condonation of delay.

4. Perusal of application would show that award was passed on 31.10.2023 and after one year and seven months, the documents were forwarded to the department seeking approval. The appellants have not explained part of delay from 31.10.2023 till 29.05.2025. It is also not stated in the application as to when sanction was accorded by the department. In my opinion, the appellants failed to explain delay part properly.

5. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Gwalior Bench) in the matter of Jahoor Khan and Ors. Vs. Ramvaran and Ors. reported in ILR (2017) MP 93 passed in Misc. Appeal No. 29 of 2016 while dealing with the issue of delay in para 7, 8, 9 and 11 held as under :-

“7. In the case of Ramlal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361, Hon. Supreme Court in para 7 has held as under:-

“7. In construing Section 5 (of the Limitation Act) it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice.”

8. Hon. Supreme Court in the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala, (1997)

7 SCC 556, has held in para 6 as under:- “6. law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.”

9. As regards meaning, scope and rationale of the law of limitation, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pundlilk Jalam Patil (Dead) by Lrs., Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon M