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2026 Supreme(Online)(Chh) 9170

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Ramesh Sinha, CJ, Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J
State Of Chhattisgarh – Appellant
Versus
Raghunath – Respondent
CRMP No. 867 of 2023



Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Priyank Rathi
For the Respondents: None listed

Government departments are not entitled to mechanical condonation of delay; they must establish 'sufficient cause' through diligent action. Appellate courts shall not interfere with an acquittal unless the view taken by the trial court is perverse or impossible.

Headnote:(A) Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 - Condonation of delay - Government departments - Obligation to perform duties with diligence - Mere mention of departmental formalities is not sufficient to condone delay - Law shelters everyone equally, and condonation of delay for government bodies should not be mechanical or an anticipated benefit. (Paras 4, 8, 9)

(B) Appeal against Acquittal - Interference with trial court judgment - Scope of interference - Appellate court should only interfere if the view taken by the trial court is impossible or perverse - Merely because another view is more probable is not sufficient ground for reversal. (Paras 3, 15, 16)

Facts of the case:
The State filed an application for leave to appeal against the acquittal of the respondent for offenses punishable under Sections 450, 376, and 506 of the IPC. The application was filed with a delay of 35 days, which the State sought to condone citing departmental formalities. The trial court had acquitted the respondent giving benefit of doubt due to contradictions, delayed FIR, and the suspicious conduct of the victim's husband.

Findings of Court:
The Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay, observing that the State failed to demonstrate sufficient cause and that Government departments are not exempt from the rigour of limitation laws. On merits, the Court found the trial court's acquittal was based on proper appreciation of evidence, noticing that the FIR was delayed by 12 days and the credibility of the prosecution case was highly doubtful.

Issues: Whether the delay of 35 days in filing the leave to appeal should be condoned and whether the trial court's judgment of acquittal warrants interference.

Ratio Decidendi: Condonation of delay is an exception, not a rule; government departments must provide cogent and specific justifications to satisfy the requirement of 'sufficient cause'. Furthermore, an appellate court cannot substitute its own view for that of the trial court in an appeal against acquittal unless the trial court's finding is proved to be perverse or impossible.

Result: Leave to appeal dismissed; appeal dismissed.

Table of Content
1. state's failure to provide sufficient cause for delay in filing appeals. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4)
2. limitation law applies equally to the government without scope for mechanical condonation. (Para 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10)
3. high threshold for reversing an acquittal; limited scope of appellate interference. (Para 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16)
4. final dismissal of the leave and the appeal. (Para 17)

Order on Board

Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

09-04-2026

1. Heard Mr. Priyank Rathi, learned Govt. Advocate for the appellant/State on I.A. No.01/2023, which is an application for condonation of delay of 35 days.

2. The State/appellant has preferred the instant application for grant of leave to appeal and appeal against the findings and judgment of acquittal dated 30.11.2022 passed by learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Ramanujganj, District Balrampur-Ramanujganj (CG) in S.T. Case No. R-69/2017, whereby the respondent/accused has been acquitted from charges punishable under sections 450, 376 & 506 of IPC.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant / State submits that though the scope of interference with an order of acquittal is limited, the appellate Court nonetheless possesses wide powers of reappreciation of evidence, and where such reappraisal reveals that the findings of acquittal are unjust, perverse or against the weight of evidence, the appellate Court is fully empowered to reverse the same. Learned State counsel submits that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is patently erroneous, perverse, and contrary to the settled principles of law. Despite there being ample, cogent, and reliable evidence available on record establishing the guilt of the accused/respondent, the learned Trial Court has erroneously acquitted him on wholly insignificant, unreasonable, and legally unsustainable grounds. The Court failed to appreciate that, the charges leveled against the respondent are very serious in nature like offence of rape and because of this reason the accused is not entitled for any sympathy by this Court. Learned trial Court failed to appreciate the circumstances and acquitted the respondent on account of minor omissions and contradictions.

4. It has been contended that the State, after obtaining necessary documents and information with respect to the case preferred the present petition, however, some delay was occurred due to fulfillment of various departmental formalities and working of the Government machinery because the State Government is a multi functioning body, hence, at times the fulfillment of departmental formalities takes unexpected long time. Therefore, in some cases the State is prevented from filing the case within the prescribed period of limitation, which is bonafide and not deliberate. The instant appeal is, therefore, being filed after a delay of 35 days from the prescribed period of limitation. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others, (1996) 3 SCC 132, to buttress his submissions. As such, the learned State counsel prays that the delay of 35 days in preferring the petition may be condoned.

5. The question for determination before this Court is whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of 1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for leave to appeal from an order of acquittal.

6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited and another, (2012) 3 SCC 563, has dealt with the limitation issue and held as under:-

“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons fam

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