Order on Board

1. The applicant being Insurance Company has called in question the legality, propriety and correctness of the proceedings initiated and order dated 10.09.2025 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals, Bilaspur C.G. in relation to MACT No.1923 of 2023 preferred under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, ‘M.V. Act’) by the Respondent No.1 whereby, application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act preferred by the Respondent No.1 has been allowed and delay in filing the claim petition has been condoned. Whereas, application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC filed by the applicant Insurance Company has been rejected.

2. The core issue involved in the present case to the maintainability of claim petition filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to condone such delay.

3. The facts, in brief are that the claimants/Respondent No.1 instituted applications under Section 166 of the M.V. Act seeking compensation on account of injuries sustained in motor accidents. However, the said claim petition was filed beyond the statutory period prescribed under Section 166(3) of the M.V. Act. Upon such filing, the present applicant/revisionist i.e., the Insurance Companies and the vehicle owners, raised objections before the concerned Tribunals and preferred applications seeking rejection of the claim petitions on the ground that the same were barred by limitation and thus not maintainable.

4. The Tribunals, however, declined to accept the objections raised by the revisionists and proceeded to entertain the claim petition by condoning the delay in filing the same. While doing so, the Tribunals, in substance, invoked principles analogous to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, ‘Limitation Act’), and held that sufficient cause had been shown for condonation of delay.

5. Consequently, the application preferred by the present revisionist under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC seeking rejection of the claim petition came to be dismissed, giving rise to the present civil revision.

6. The applicant has assailed the impugned order primarily on the ground that the learned Tribunal has acted with material irregularity and illegality in assuming jurisdiction not vested in them by law. It is contended that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, being a statutory forum constituted under the M.V. Act, is bound by the provisions of the said Act and cannot travel beyond the same. According to the applicants, there is no provision under the Act, particularly after the amendments brought into force, which empowers the Tribunal to condone delay in filing claim petitions under Section 166 of the M.V. Act, and therefore, the invocation of principles akin to Section 5 of the Limitation Act is wholly misconceived and impermissible.

7. It is further contended that the claim petition, having been instituted beyond the statutorily prescribed period, could not have been entertained at all, and the failure on the part of the learned Tribunals to reject such petition at the threshold amounts to a jurisdictional error. It has also been urged that, in several instances, the delay has been condoned without affording adequate and effective opportunity of hearing to the present revisionist, i.e., the Insurance Company thereby resulting in violation of the principles of natural justice. According to the applicant, the impugned order thus suffer from non-application of mind, patent illegality and jurisdictional infirmity, warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.

8. It is further submitted that the issue relating to the scope, applicability and condonability of delay under Section 166(3) of the M.V. Act has been engaging consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a batch of proceedings, wherein interim protection has also been granted. In the said proceedings, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has, inter al