Pending the Supreme Court's final decision on the issue, Motor Accident Claims Tribunals cannot dismiss claim petitions solely on the ground of limitation under Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Headnote:(A) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Sections 166 and 166(3) - Maintainability of claim petitions - Limitation - Jurisdiction of Tribunal to condone delay - The core issue pertains to the maintainability of claim petitions filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to condone such delay. The Insurance Companies contended that there is no provision under the Act empowering the Tribunal to condone delay, and the invocation of principles akin to Section 5 of the Limitation Act is impermissible. (Para 3, 7, 8)

(B) Practice and Procedure - Revisional Jurisdiction - Interference by High Court - The High Court found that the challenge laid by the applicants does not warrant interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction at this stage, particularly in light of the binding interim directions of the Supreme Court. (Para 14)

(C) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Section 166(3) - Limitation - Pending Adjudication - The issue of limitation is pending before the Supreme Court. The Court directed that the concerned Tribunals shall proceed with the adjudication of claim petitions, but no final award shall be passed until the limitation issue is conclusively decided by the Apex Court. (Para 11, 16)

Facts of the case:
In all these revisions, the applicants, comprising Insurance Companies as well as vehicle owners, challenged the proceedings and orders of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals. The claims were filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 beyond the statutory period. The Tribunals declined to reject the petitions and condoned the delay, invoking principles analogous to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The applicants then filed these civil revisions. (Paras 2-5)

Findings of Court:
The Court found that the Tribunals' orders to entertain the claim petitions, rather than reject them at the threshold, do not suffer from jurisdictional error or material irregularity, especially in light of the Supreme Court's interim directions. The Court adopted a balanced approach, directing the Tribunals to proceed with adjudication but prohibiting the passing of a final award until the Supreme Court conclusively decides the limitation issue. All contentions of the parties are kept open. (Paras 13-16)

Issues: The main issues were the maintainability of claim petitions filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation under Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to condone such delay in the absence of a specific provision.

Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that in light of the pending adjudication of the limitation issue by the Supreme Court and its interim directions, the claim petitions should not be dismissed solely on the ground of limitation. The Tribunals may proceed with adjudication, but final orders are stayed until the Apex Court's decision. (Para 16) Result : All civil revisions disposed of. (Para 18)

1. Since a common question of law and fact arises for consideration in the present batch of civil revisions, all the matters were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common order.

2. In all these revisions, the applicants, comprising Insurance Companies as well as vehicle owners, have called in question the legality, propriety and correctness of the proceedings initiated and orders passed by the respective Motor Accident Claims Tribunals in relation to claim petitions preferred under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, ‘M.V. Act’).

3. The core issue involved in all the cases pertains to the maintainability of claim petitions filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to condone such delay.

4. The facts, in brief, as obtaining in all the cases, are broadly similar and are therefore being noticed in a consolidated manner. In each of these cases, the claimants instituted applications under Section 166 of the M.V. Act seeking compensation on account of injuries sustained in motor accidents. However, the said claim petitions were filed beyond the statutory period prescribed under Section 166 (3) of the M.V. Act. Upon such filing, the present applicants/revisionists, i.e., the Insurance Companies and the vehicle owners, raised objections before the concerned Tribunals and preferred applications seeking rejection of the claim petitions on the ground that the same were barred by limitation and thus not maintainable.

5. The respective Tribunals, however, declined to accept the objections raised by the revisionists and proceeded to entertain the claim petitions by condoning the delay in filing the same. While doing so, the Tribunals, in substance, invoked principles analogous to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, ‘Limitation Act’), and held that sufficient cause had been shown for condonation of delay.

6. Consequently, the applications preferred by the present revisionists under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC seeking rejection of the claim petitions came to be dismissed, giving rise to the present batch of civil revisions.

7. The applicants have assailed the impugned orders primarily on the ground that the learned Tribunals have acted with material irregularity and illegality in assuming jurisdiction not vested in them by law. It is contended that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, being a statutory forum constituted under the M.V. Act, is bound by the provisions of the said Act and cannot travel beyond the same. According to the applicants, there is no provision under the Act, particularly after the amendments brought into force, which empowers the Tribunal to condone delay in filing claim petitions under Section 166 of the M.V. Act, and therefore, the invocation of principles akin to Section 5 of the Limitation Act is wholly misconceived and impermissible.

8. It is further contended that the claim petitions, having been instituted beyond the statutorily prescribed period, could not have been entertained at all, and the failure on the part of the learned Tribunals to reject such petitions at the threshold amounts to a jurisdictional error. It has also been urged that, in several instances, the delay has been condoned without affording adequate and effective opportunity of hearing to the present revisionists, i.e., the Insurance Companies as well as the vehicle owners, thereby resulting in violation of the principles of natural justice. According to the applicants, the impugned orders thus suffer from non-application of mind, patent illegality and jurisdictional infirmity, warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.

9. It is further submitted that the issue relating to the scope, applicability and condonability of delay under Section 166 (3) of the M.V. Act has been engaging consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a batch of proceedings, wherein interim protection has also been granted. In the said pro

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