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2026 Supreme(Online)(Chh) 14036

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J
STATE OF CHHATTISGARH – Appellant
Versus
MAMTA TIWARI – Respondent
CRMP No. 1254 of 2024



Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Ms. Supriya Upasane, G.A.
For the Respondents:

Government departments are not entitled to a liberal interpretation of 'sufficient cause' for condoning inordinate delays; bureaucratic red tape is not a valid excuse, and the law of limitation applies equally to the State as it does to private litigants.

Headnote:The State filed an application for condonation of delay of 1752 days in seeking leave to appeal against an acquittal order dated 12.04.2019 passed in Sessions Case No. 08/2018 under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. The State contended that the delay was due to departmental formalities and the functioning of government machinery. The primary issue was whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, apply to an application for leave to appeal from an order of acquittal and whether the State demonstrated 'sufficient cause'. The court reasoned that the law of limitation binds everyone, including the Government, and that bureaucratic red tape or impersonal machinery cannot be accepted as a valid explanation for inordinate delay, especially when negligence or lack of bona fides is evident. In view of the above, the instant petition seeking leave to appeal is hereby rejected on the ground of delay and laches.

Table of Content
1. state's plea for condonation of delay based on bureaucratic formalities and departmental procedures. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4)
2. government bodies are not exempt from limitation laws and must demonstrate 'sufficient cause' without negligence. (Para 5 , 6 , 7 , 8)
3. accountability of government officials for delays and the requirement that cause must arise within the limitation period. (Para 9 , 10 , 11)

Order on Board

1. Heard Ms. S. Upasane, learned Govt. Advocate for the appellant/State on I.A. No.01/2024, which is an application for condonation of delay of 1752 days occurred in filing of the appeal.

2. The State/appellant has preferred the instant application for grant of leave to appeal and appeal against the findings and judgment of acquittal dated 12.04.2019, passed in Sessions Case No. 08/2018, by the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Bemetara, District Bematara (C.G.) whereby acquitting the respondents No.1 to 5 from the offence punishable under under Section 306 of Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred as ‘IPC’)

3. Learned counsel for the appellant / State submits that though the scope of interference with an order of acquittal is limited, the appellate Court nonetheless possesses wide powers of reappreciation of evidence, and where such reappraisal reveals that the findings of acquittal are unjust, perverse or against the weight of evidence, the appellate Court is fully empowered to reverse the same. Learned State counsel submits that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is patently erroneous, perverse, and contrary to the settled principles of law. Despite there being ample, cogent, and reliable evidence available on record establishing the guilt of the accused/respondents, the learned Trial Court has erroneously acquitted them on wholly insignificant, unreasonable, and legally unsustainable grounds. Learned trial Court failed to appreciate the circumstances and acquitted the respondents on account of minor omissions and contradictions.

4. It has been contended that the State, after obtaining necessary documents and information with respect to the case preferred the present petition, however, some delay was occurred due to fulfillment of various departmental formalities and working of the Government machinery because the State Government is a multi functioning body, hence, at times the fulfillment of departmental formalities takes unexpected long time. Therefore, in some cases the State is prevented from filing the case within the prescribed period of limitation, which is bonafide and not deliberate. The instant appeal is, therefore, being filed after a delay of 1752 days from the prescribed period of limitation. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others , (1996) 3 SCC 132, to buttress his submissions. As such, the learned State counsel prays that the delay of 1752 days in preferring the petition may be condoned.

5. The question for determination before this Court is whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of 1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for leave to appeal from an order of acquittal.

6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited and another , (2012) 3 SCC 563, has dealt with the limitation issue and held as under:-

“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically m

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