Order on Board

Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J.

1. Heard Mr. Ashish Shukla, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the State/Petitioner on I.A. No. 01, which is an application for condonation of delay of 124 days in preferring the instant appeal.

2. The State/petitioner has preferred the instant application for grant of leave to appeal along with acquittal appeal against the judgment dated 31.10.2022 passed in Sessions Trial No. 91/2019 by the Court of learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Balrampur, place at Ramanujganj (C.G.), whereby respondent No.1 has been acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 302/34, 201/34, 120-B of the IPC and Sections 25(1-B)(B) read with Section 27 of the Arms Act, and respondent No.2 has been acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 201/34, 120-B of the IPC and Sections 25(1-B)(B) read with Section 27 of the Arms Act.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner / State submits that though the scope of interference with an order of acquittal is limited, the appellate Court nonetheless possesses wide powers of reappreciation of evidence, and where such reappraisal reveals that the findings of acquittal are unjust, perverse or against the weight of evidence, the appellate Court is fully empowered to reverse the same. Learned State counsel submits that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is patently erroneous, perverse, and contrary to the settled principles of law. Despite there being ample, cogent, and reliable evidence available on record establishing the guilt of the accused/respondents, the learned Trial Court has erroneously acquitted them on wholly insignificant, unreasonable, and legally unsustainable grounds. Learned trial Court failed to appreciate the circumstances and acquitted the respondents on account of minor omissions and contradictions.

4. It has been contended that the State, after obtaining necessary documents and information with respect to the case preferred the present petition, however, some delay was occurred due to fulfillment of various departmental formalities and working of the Government machinery because the State Government is a multi functioning body, hence, at times the fulfillment of departmental formalities takes unexpected long time. Therefore, in some cases the State is prevented from filing the case within the prescribed period of limitation, which is bonafide and not deliberate. The instant appeal is, therefore, being filed after a delay of 124 days from the prescribed period of limitation. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others, (1996) 3 SCC 132, to buttress his submissions. As such, the learned State counsel prays that the delay of 124 days in preferring the petition may be condoned.

5. The question for determination before this Court is whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of 1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for leave to appeal from an order of acquittal.

6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited and another, (2012) 3 SCC 563, has dealt with the limitation issue and held as under:-

“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or delib