J U D G M E N T

PRATEEK JALAN, J. (ORAL)

CM APPL. 33193/2022 (for exemption)

Exemption allowed, subject to all just exceptions.

The application stands disposed of.

CM APPL. 33192/2022 (for condonation of delay)

1. This is an application for condonation of delay of 2108 days in filing of an appeal against a judgment and decree dated 27.05.2016, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, North District, Delhi in CS 239/2015. By way of the impugned judgment, the learned Trial Court has decreed a suit filed by the respondent/ plaintiff for possession of the suit property bearing No. A-21, Khasra No. 35, Revenue Estate of village Bharolla, alongwith mesne profits/damages and costs.

2. According to the filing details available, the present appeal was filed only on 27.07.2022. Mr. Dhanesh Relan, learned Standing Counsel for the appellant – Municipal Corporation of Delhi [“MCD”], states that the appeal was in fact filed in the month of May, 2022, but cleared only in July, 2022. Having regard to the admitted extent of the delay, this minor discrepancy need not detain us.

3. In the application for condonation of delay, MCD has stated that, after the passing of the impugned judgment, the file was sent to its learned counsel for filing of the appeal. Counsel required certain documents to be supplied, which could not be done due to the fact that the Keshav Puram Zone was created from the Civil Zone of the MCD in the interregnum, and the files of the case were mixed up with other files. The application contains no other averments, save for reliance upon the order of the Supreme Court in Suo Moto W.P.(C) 3/2020 [In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation], whereby the limitation period for filing of the proceedings has been extended by approximately two years during the COVID-19 pandemic.

4. The appeal was first listed before the Court on 29.07.2022, when the appellant was granted time to file an additional affidavit to explain the delay. The additional affidavit was filed on 03.09.2022, and contains largely the same averments as in the original application. The only additional fact mentioned is that MCD has appointed an inquiry committee to fix responsibility for the delay.

5. The judgments of the Supreme Court dealing with the principles for condonation of delay make it clear that the Court is required to undertake a fact-based examination of the sufficiency of the cause shown by the appellant. In Basawaraj vs. Land Acquisition Officer,1 the Supreme Court noted that where a case has been presented beyond limitation, the applicant has to provide sufficient cause for the same, i.e., “an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation.” Mr. Rajesh Yadav, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, relies on Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh and Others,2 where the Supreme Court observed that even if the term “sufficient cause” is read liberally, “it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned,” and the Court should take into account “whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution.” In University of Delhi vs. Union of India3 also, the Court held that, if an inordinate delay was condoned without taking into consideration the “lackadaisical manner in which the appellant has proceeded in the matter, it would also be contrary to public interest.”

6. In the context of application of these principles to a government body, such as MCD, Mr. Yadav relies upon various judgements to urge that a lenient attitude ought not to lead to condonation of unexplained and inordinate delay caused by a government agency. In Postmaster General

1 (2013) 14 SCC 81, para 15.

2 (2010) 8 SCC 685, para 25 and 38.

and Others v. Living Media India Limited and Another,4 the Supreme Court, while dismissing appeals on the ground of delay, observed that “government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their dutie