J U D G M E N T

1. The Managing Committee of the D.A.V. College has approached this Court assailing the validity of an interim direction dated 02 March 2023 framed by the learned Single Judge in a pending writ petition. In terms of the order impugned the learned Single Judge taking note of the claim of the petitioners who were seeking benefits of pay revision under the 6th and 7th Central Pay Commission1 along with other benefits, has called upon the appellant to refix the pay band of the petitioners in accordance with the 6th CPC and to release arrears within four weeks. It has been further observed that it would be open for the appellant while disbursing arrears to make appropriate adjustments bearing in mind any amounts that may have already been released while implementing the recommendations of the CPC.

2. The aforesaid interim order is assailed solely on the ground of the claim raised in the writ petition being barred by delay and laches. The writ petition was filed originally in April 2021 seeking the absorption of the petitioners in a recognised school run by the D.A.V. College Managing Committee as well as for the release of arrears of salaries and other dues as flowing from the 6th and 7th CPCs‟. As per the appellants, the school in question had sought closure permission in 2014. That permission was not granted. It is further disclosed in the appeal that while initially the writ petition had dealt with the validity of a transfer order dated 26 March 2021, ultimately the issue of asserted arrears payable in terms of the 6th and 7th CPCs came to be raised. It was while dealing with the aforesaid issue that the impugned order of 02 March 2023 came to be passed.

3. Ms. Anand, learned senior counsel appearing in support of the appeal has questioned the validity of the aforesaid order contending that the claim as raised is clearly hit by laches, a principle which must necessarily be recognised to apply bearing in mind the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Rushibhai Jagdishchandra

1 CPC

Pathak v. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation2. According to Ms. Anand, Rushibhai reiterates the salient principles which were propounded by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh3 and which had held that stale claims should not be countenanced by High Courts in exercise of their writ jurisdiction. Ms. Anand further submitted that even if the question of arrears were to be considered, the claim could have at best been entertained for the period of three years immediately preceding institution of proceedings before this Court. According to learned senior counsel, the interim directions, if permitted to hold the field, would place a huge financial burden upon the appellant and in any case amount to the recognition of a claim which is clearly barred by laches.

4. It is pertinent to note that the sheet anchor of the challenge raised in the appeal rests on Rushibhai and on the strength of which, Ms. Anand had sought to contend that the principle of laches would clearly apply and that the learned Single Judge should have at best restricted the claim of the writ petitioners to a period of three years prior to the initiation of proceedings before this Court. The decision in Rushibhai was essentially dealing with the correctness of a decision of the Gujarat High Court which had proceeded to partially allow an appeal preferred by the Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation accepting its challenge to the grant of a higher pay scale to the appellants there as being barred by delay and laches. As the Supreme Court records in Rushibhai, the appellants there were essentially aggrieved by the

2 2022 SCC OnLine SC 641

3 (2008) 8 SCC 648

refixation of their pay scales in terms of an order dated 28 October 2010. It was that order which was assailed before the Gujarat High Court by way of a writ petition preferred in September 2017. While dealing with the issue of delay and laches which arose, the Supreme Court in Rushibhai had observed as follows:-

“9. The