The NCDRC's requirement for a full deposit of the decretal amount contravenes Section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act, which mandates a deposit of 50% or Rs. 35,000, whichever is less.

1. The present petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court to impugn the order dated 30.10.2019 passed by the learned National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi (“NCDRC”) in First Appeal bearing no. 1115 of 2019 titled as “M/s. DSS Buildtech Pvt. Ltd & Ors vs. Manoj Kayal” whereby the learned NCDRC partly heard the arguments on admission of the appeal and directed the appellants including the petitioner herein to deposit the entire decretal amount before the learned state commission as a condition for grant of stay. The petitioner herein is the appellant no. 1 before the learned NCDRC. Page 2 of 5

2. The petitioner is a company incorporated under the Companies Act with its office at 506, 5th Floor, Time Square Building, B block, Sushant Lok, Phase-1, Gurugram, Haryana, which is engaged in the Real Estate Development Sector. Mr. Paras Kumar Jain is the authorized representative of the petitioner company vide Board Resolution dated 27.05.2019, who has filed the present petition.

3. The short controversy that arises in the present petition pertains to the issue put forth by the petitioner herein that while the arguments on admission of appeal were pending before the learned NCDRC, it directed the petitioner (appellant therein), to deposit 100% of the decretal amount as a condition for grant of stay, which is agitated to be contrary to the statutory mandate under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 specifically under section 19, which stipulates deposit of 50% or the amount of rupees thirty-five thousand, whichever is less with respect to the decretal amount as ordered by the State Commission. It is submitted that present matter is squarely covered by Section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 .

Thus, such an order directing 100 % of the decretal amount cannot be passed by the learned NCDRC.

4. At this stage, it will also be apposite to extract the section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which reads as follows:

"19. Appeals.—Any person aggrieved by:, an order made by the State Commission in exercise of its powers conferred by sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 17 may prefer an appeal against such order to the National Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order in such form and manner as may be prescribed:

Page 3 of 5 Provided that the National Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied, that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:

Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the State Commission, shall be entertained by the National Commission unless the Petitioner has deposited in the prescribed manner fifty per cent, of the amount or rupees thirty-five thousand, whichever is less."

(Emphasis supplied)

5. Furthermore, it is also the case of the petitioner that the learned NCDRC has passed two identical orders in two completely different matters, one passed in the present case and the other passed in First Appeal No. 1032/2019 titled as M/s Taneja Developers & Infrastructure v Varun Gupta. Ex-facie the orders are identical in nature barring changes in the factual dates in the given cases. Also, the two orders have been passed on the same day and appear to have been passed in a mechanical manner which is not permissible in law.

6. It is submitted that the impugned order is not sustainable, thus, be set aside and the case be remanded back to the learned NCDRC to be re- considered with respect to conditional order of stay and admission of appeal.

7. The learned counsel for the respondent has no objection in case the present matter is remanded back to the learned NCDRC.

8. Notably, on perusal of the record, it would appear that the learned NCDRC has not formulated an opinion as to admission of appeal or as to issuance of notice to the r