O R D E R

% 16.08.2024 I.A. 2803/2018 (Recall of order dt. 19.01.17 and restoration) and I.A. 2804/2018 (delay of 365 days in filing) in O.M.P. 406/2011 & I.A. 2807/2018 (Recall of order dt. 19.01.17 and restoration) and I.A. 2808/2018 (delay of 365 days in filing) in O.M.P. 424/2011

1. OMP 406/2011 and OMP 424/2011 were dismissed for non-

prosecution on 19 January 2017.

2. IA 2803/2018 and IA 2807/2018 seek restoration of OMP 406/2011 and OMP 424/2011 and IA 2804/2018 and IA 2808/2018 O.M.P.406/2011&otherconnectedmatters Page2of seek condonation of delay of 365 days in filing IA 2803/2018 and IA

2807/2018 respectively.

3. In IA 2804/2018 and IA 2808/2018, it is specifically averred on oath, that the petitioner came to know of the dismissal of these two petitions on 19 January 2017 only in January 2018, whereafter the present applications have been moved.

4. It is seen from the record that, on 19 January 2017, OMP 406/2011 and 424/2011 were listed at S. No. 435 and 436 on the Regular board of this Court. It is a matter of common knowledge that, oftentimes, when cases are listed in the regular list, it becomes difficult for parties, or even Counsel, to keep track of their listing and, at times, petitions are dismissed in default and for non-prosecution.

5. In the interests of ensuring that parties are given the fullest opportunity to ventilate their claims, this Court has always been liberal in condoning delay in such cases, when restoration is sought.

6. Mr. Moitra, learned Counsel for the respondent, vociferously opposes the present applications. He sought to place reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [1(2013)14SCC81] and MTNL v. Applied Electronics Ltd, [2(2017)2SCC37]

7. Neither of these decisions can really affect the present applications. The paragraphs on which Mr. Moitra places reliance in O.M.P.406/2011&otherconnectedmatters Page3of “9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no morethanthat whichprovides aplatitude, which whenthe act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See: Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee, [3AIR1964SC1336], Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, [4AIR1970SC1953]; Parimal v. Veena, [5AIR2011SC1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, [6AIR2012SC1629].)

10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, [Basawaraj read thus:] this Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proofthat that of“sufficient cause”

11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure