O R D E R (ORAL)

% 25.07.2022

1. A learned three-member Arbitral Tribunal has, in arbitral proceedings between the parties of which it is in seisin, passed an interlocutory order on 18th June 2022, rejecting an application filed by the petitioner under Order VII Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to bring on record additional documents.

2. This petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, assails the said order.

3. To my mind, the present petition is not maintainable, in view of the following enunciation of the law, to be found in paras 45 and 46 of the report in SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd.1:

―45. It is seen that some High Courts have proceeded on the basis that any order passed by an arbitral tribunal during arbitration, would be capable of being challenged under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. We see no warrant for such an approach. Section 37 makes certain orders of the arbitral tribunal appealable. Under Section 34, the aggrieved party has an avenue for ventilating his grievances against the award including any in-between orders that might have been passed by the arbitral tribunal acting under Section 16 of the Act. The party aggrieved by any order of the arbitral tribunal, unless has a right of appeal under Section 37 of the Act, has to wait until the award is passed by the Tribunal. This appears to be the scheme of the Act. The arbitral tribunal is after all, the creature of a contract between the parties, the arbitration agreement, even though if the occasion arises, the Chief Justice may constitute it based on the contract between the parties. But that would not alter the status of the arbitral tribunal. It will still be a forum chosen by the parties by agreement. We, therefore, disapprove of the stand adopted by some of the High Courts that any order passed by the arbitral tribunal is capable of being corrected by the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. Such an intervention by the High Courts is not permissible.

46. The object of minimizing judicial intervention while the matter is in the process of being arbitrated upon, will certainly be defeated if the High Court could be approached under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against every order made by the arbitral tribunal. Therefore, it is necessary to indicate that once the arbitration has commenced in the arbitral tribunal, parties have to wait until the award is pronounced unless, of course, a right of appeal is available to them under Section

37 of the Act even at an earlier stage.‖

(Emphasis supplied)

There is no equivocation, whatsoever, in the exposition of the legal position by the Supreme Court, in the afore-extracted passages. The

1 (2005) 8 SCC 618

Court can be approached against an interim order in arbitral proceedings only if the order is appealable under Section 372 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (―the 1996 Act‖). In all other cases, the litigant, who deems himself aggrieved, has to await the conclusion of the arbitral proceedings and rendition of award therein. 4. Appeals to the Court lie, against arbitral orders, only under sub- section (2) of Section 37, if they are rendered under Section 16(2) or (3), or Section 17 of the 1996 Act. The impugned order has been passed under Order VII Rule 14 of the CPC, and is not relatable to any of these provisions. Nor, for that matter, does Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, so seek to contend.

5. Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, instead, sought to advance a submission that the rationale of para 45 of the decision in SBP1, as apparent from the passage, was that the interim order, being sought to be challenged under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, would otherwise be amenable to challenge under Section 34 of the Act. He bases this submission on the observation, to be found in the said passage, that ―under Section 34, the aggrieved party has an ave