Judicial interference in arbitral proceedings is limited to exceptional circumstances, emphasizing the need for minimal intervention to uphold the integrity of the arbitration process.

JUDGMENT :

SACHIN DATTA, J.

1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner being aggrieved with the orders dated 09.05.2024 and 31.12.2024 passed by the learned Arbitrator, who is seized of the arbitral proceedings between the parties.

2. The arbitral proceedings are ongoing under the aegis of Delhi International Arbitration Centre (DIAC). The arbitral proceedings have been occasioned on account of non-payment/ non-clearance of the bills of the petitioner, raised upon the respondent.

3. An order dated 09.05.2024 came to be passed by the learned Arbitrator dismissing the petitioner’s application for “disclosure of documents in the possession of the respondent”. Vide order dated 31.12.2024, the learned Arbitrator dismissed the petitioner’s application seeking permission to call additional witness.

4. It is a settled law that courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can interfere with the arbitral process only when the circumstances are exceptional or perverse. The Supreme Court in Bhaven Construction vs Executive Engineer, Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Limited and Anr. /b>., (2022) 1 SCC 75 while limiting judicial interference under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India to ‘exceptional rarity’ held as under:

“12. We need to note that the Arbitration Act is a code in itself. This phrase is not merely perfunctory, but has definite legal consequences. One such consequence is spelled out under Section 5 of the Arbitration Act, which reads as under “5. Extent of judicial intervention.—Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part.” (emphasis supplied)

The non obstante clause is provided to uphold the intention of the legislature as provided in the Preamble to adopt Uncitral Model Law and Rules, to reduce excessive judicial interference which is not contemplated under the Arbitration Act.

13. The Arbitration Act itself gives various procedures and forums to challenge the appointment of an arbitrator. The framework clearly portrays an intention to address most of the issues within the ambit of the Act itself, without there being scope for any extra statutory mechanism to provide just and fair solutions.

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18. In any case, the hierarchy in our legal framework, mandates that a legislative enactment cannot curtail a constitutional right. In Nivedita Sharma v. COAI [ Nivedita Sharma v. COAI , (2011) 14 SCC 337: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 947 ] , this Court referred to several judgments and held: (SCC p. 343, para 11)

“11. We have considered the respective arguments/submissions. There cannot be any dispute that the power of the High Courts to issue directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and prohibition under Article 226 of the Constitution is a basic feature of the Constitution and cannot be curtailed by parliamentary legislation — L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India [ L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India , (1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] . However, it is one thing to say that in exercise of the power vested in it under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court can entertain a writ petition against any order passed by or action taken by the State and/or its agency/instrumentality or any public authority or order passed by a quasi-judicial body/authority, and it is an altogether different thing to say that each and every petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution must be entertained by the High Court as a matter of course ignoring the fact that the aggrieved person has an effective alternative remedy. Rather, it is settled law that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.”

(emphasis supplied)

It is therefore, prudent for a Judge to not exercise discretion to allow judicial inter