JUDGMENT

MANOJ KUMAR OHRI, J.

CM. APPL.No.44531/2019 (delay in re-filing)

1. The present application has been filed under Section 151 CPC on behalf of the appellant seeking condonation of delay of ten days in re-filing the appeal.

2. For the reasons stated in the application, the same is allowed and the delay of ten days in re-filing the appeal is condoned.

3. The application stands disposed of.

FAO 406/2019 & CM. APPL. No. 44529/2019 (Stay)

1. By way of the present appeal filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter, ‘the Act’), the appellant seeks to assail order dated 24.05.2019 passed by the learned ADJ-04, New Delhi in Arbitration Petition No.4245/2017, whereby appellant’s objections filed under Section 34 of the Act to the arbitral Award dated 25.02.2017 were dismissed, solely on the ground that the same were barred by limitation.

2. Ms.Kanika Agnihotri, learned ASC for the appellant, submitted that the impugned Award was passed on 25.02.2017 but the same came to be signed on 26.02.2017, as is apparent from the concluding page of the Award. The copy of the Award was received in the office of the respondent on 28.02.2017 and by excluding the said date, limitation period would begin from 01.03.2017. On the strength of these submissions, it was contended that the appellant’s objections under Section 34 of the Act filed on

29.05.2017 were within the period of limitation.

It was also brought to the notice of the Court that after passing of the impugned order, the appellant had filed an application seeking recall thereof, as concerned counsel of the appellant had noted wrong date of hearing i.e. 28.05.2019 instead of 24.05.2019, and the impugned order came to be passed in its absence. In support, it was submitted that alongwith the recall application, the appellant had also attached a copy of its register showing that copy of the Award was received on 28.02.2017.

3. Per contra, Mr. Sunil Kumar Agarwal, learned counsel for the respondent, supported the impugned order. He denied the appellant’s submission that a copy of the Award was received by it on 28.02.2017 and submitted that the objections filed by the appellant were not accompanied by any application under the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay.

4. Having heard the learned counsels for the parties, this Court finds merit in the submissions made on behalf of the appellant for the reasons discussed hereinafter.

5. A reading of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 would show that it stipulates thus:-

“9. Commencement and termination of time.—(1) In any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “from”, and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “or”.

(2) This section applies also to all Central Acts made after the third day of January, 1868, and to all Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887.”

6. In terms of the above provision, the first day is to be excluded while computing period of limitation if the word used in the relevant provision is ‘from’. To determine if the objections filed by the appellant were within limitation, it is apposite to advert to Section 34 of the Act, which reads as under:-

“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.—(1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3).

xxx (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:

Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient