$~50 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % Judgment delivered on: 10.12.2024 + LPA 300/2018 and CM APPL. 49216/2023 (Stay), CM APPL.

55272/2023 (Stay), CM APPL. 48799/2024 (Addl. Document)

BANK OF BARODA ERSTWHILE VIJAYA BANK .....Appellant Through: Mr. Chinmoy Pradip Sharma, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Kush Sharma, Standing Counsel and Ms. Asiya Khan, Mr. Irfan Hasieb, Mr. Krishnajyoti Deka, Mr. Vijay Deora, Mr. Nishchaya Nigam and Ms.

Vagmi Singh, Advs.

versus UNION OF INDIA & ORS .....Respondents Through: Mr. Rajesh Kumar, SPC with Mr. Rishesh Mani Tripathi, Mr. Yash Narain, Mr. Changez Alikhan, Ms. Mishika Pandita and Mr. Rahul Kumar Sharma, Advs. for R-1/UOI Mr. Manoj Joshi, Adv. for R-2 alongwith respondent no.2/Sh.

Ish Kumar Pruthi.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE YASHWANT VARMA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DHARMESH SHARMA

J U D G M E N T

YASHWANT VARMA, J. (Oral)

1. The instant appeal is directed against the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge dated 14 December 2017, dismissing a writ petition preferred by the appellant and which had questioned the validity of an Award passed by the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Court, [Tribunal] dated 18 March 2004.

2. The industrial dispute itself pertained to the validity of the action of the appellant in dispensing with the services of the respondent-workman. The Tribunal had answered the reference in favour of the workman and directed reinstatement with continuity of service, full back wages and all consequential benefits.

3. From the facts which have come to be recorded by the learned Single Judge, we find that one of the issues that came to be framed by the Tribunal was with respect to the validity of the domestic enquiry that had been conducted by the appellant. The Tribunal had ultimately found that the said enquiry was flawed and conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice. This becomes evident from a reading of paragraphs 46 and 47 of the judgment impugned before us and which are extracted hereinbelow:

“46 The reference, to the proceedings on 20th August 1993, as contained in the Inquiry Report submitted by the I/O, for its part, read thus:

“On 20^th August 1993, that Defence Representative did not turn up in time at the appointed time i.e. 10 AM, I had joined the proceedings after 12 noon and waited for the Defence Representative. At 12:30 PM, the CSE produced a letter written by the Defence Representative intimating his inability to attend the Inquiry due to personal reasons. Since enough chances and time were already given to the chargesheeted employee I did not agree to further adjournments as all the witnesses were present. I requested Mr I K Pruthi to Cross-examine witnesses, but he did not agree for the same. He was also asked to seek the services of any other person who would defend his case, but he only sought for a further adjournments without any reasonable ground. The proceedings were then conducted at 2: 15 PM.” (Emphasis supplied)

One is forced to comment, on reading the manner in which the IO has chosen to refer to the proceedings of 20^th August, 1993, that he has been less than economical with the truth. There is no reference, whatsoever, to the submission, of the respondent, that the child of the DR was unwell, and that adjournment had been sought, on 20^th Signature Not Verified

Digitally Signed

August 1993, on that ground. Rather, the reference, of the IO, in the above extracted paras from the Inquiry Report, to the adjournment, on 20^th August 1993, having been sought by the DR "on personal reasons", and the finding that the respondent had sought for an adjournment "without any reasonable ground", appear to be consciously misleading. Without any further comment on the conduct of the IO in this regard, I am constrained to observe that, even in law, the IO erred in relying on the fact that adjournments had been granted earlier. Once, on the request of the respondent, the IO had been directed to proceed with the enquiry de novo, the