2024 Supreme(Online)(Del) 33516
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER J AND K ERA – Appellant
Versus
M/S ABHIRAM INFRA PROJECTS PVT LTD – Respondent
FAO(OS) (COMM)-261/2024
$~64 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % Date of Decision: 11.12.2024 + FAO(OS) (COMM) 261/2024 & CM Nos.67258/2024 &
67261/2024 THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER J&K ERA .....Appellant Through: Mr. Praveen Chauhan, Mr. Sarthak, Ms.Malvica and Mr. Parth Awsthi, Advocates Versus M/S ABHIRAM INFRA PROJECTS PVT LTD .....Respondent Through: Mr. Aditya Sikka, Ms. Orshi Kahhar and Mr. Digvijay Singh, Advocates CORAM:
HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TUSHAR RAO GEDELA VIBHU BAKHRU, ACJ. (ORAL
1. The appellant has filed the present appeal under Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereafter the A&C Act) impugning the judgment dated 31.07.2024 (hereafter the impugned judgment) delivered by the learned Single Judge in O.M.P(COMM) 25/2023 captioned The Chief Executive Officer J and K ERA Srinagar Kashmir v. Abhiram Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd.
2. The appellant had preferred the aforementioned application for setting aside an arbitral award dated 18.05.2022 (hereafter the impugned award) rendered by an Arbitral Tribunal comprising of three members. The learned Single Judge dismissed the said application as barred by limitation.
3. As noted above, the impugned award was rendered on 18.05.2022 and FAO(OS) (COMM) No.261/2024 Page 1 of 8 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:RAM the appellant had filed the petition after 30.11.2022. Concededly, the petition had been filed beyond the period of three months from the date of receipt of the impugned award and the delay exceeded the maximum period of thirty days that could be condoned by virtue of proviso to Section 34(3)
of the A&C Act.
4. Undisputedly, the question whether the court can condone the delay beyond thirty days in filing a petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act to set aside an arbitral award is no longer res integra. The Supreme Court in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co.: (2001) 8 SCC 470 authoritatively held that delay beyond the stipulated period of thirty days cannot be condoned.
5. It is the appellant’s contention that the A&C Act is not applicable as the disputes had arisen in respect of a contract that was required to be performed in the State of Jammu & Kashmir. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the Jammu & Kashmir Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1997 (hereafter the J&K Act) is applicable and the period of limitation for filing an application to set aside the arbitral award is required to be considered in reference to the J&K Act.
6. The learned Single Judge found that the said contention was misdirected and rejected the same. The impugned award was rendered under the A&C Act and the application for setting aside the same was filed under Section 34 of the A&C Act. In the said backdrop, the learned Single Judge observed that whilst it may have been open for the appellant to contend that the arbitration ought to have proceeded under the J&K Act, the appellant had not done so. The learned Single Judge held that since the application to FAO(OS) (COMM) No.261/2024 Page 2 of 8 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:RAM set aside the impugned award had been filed under Section 34 of the A&C Act, the same could be entertained only if it was filed within the time as prescribed for filing such an application. The relevant extracts of the impugned judgment noting the appellants contentions as well as the reasoning for rejecting the same are set out below:
“4. Mr. Chauhan, learned Counsel for the petitioner, seeks to contend, per contra, that his basic case is that the Arbitral Tribunal erred in proceeding in terms of the 1996 Act and that, according to him, the J&K Act was applicable. He submits that the challenge to the present award would be within the time provided for challenging an arbitral award under the J&K Act. Without examining which Act applies, therefore, Mr Chauhan would seek to submit that this petition cannot be dismissed as time-barred.
5 The contention, in my opinion, is misdirected.
6. The arbitral awa